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“Sustainability” surely figures amongst the most discussed themes by 
corporate lawyers and policymakers at the global level in the last years. In 
particular, much attention has been devoted to the performance of firms 
managed in a “sustainable” way and on how to design an ESG 
(environmental, social, governance) factors disclosure framework that 
provides meaningful information to investors. At the same time, 
policymakers around the world believe that non-financial factors 
disclosure would foster a reallocation of capital to “sustainable” firms, 
contributing to the solution of some of the most pressing issues of our 
time. However, what should be measured and how to measure it is not a 
merely technical issue but depends on political choices: the concept of 
sustainability should be declined as plural. In order to assess which 
concept of sustainability is embedded into indicators it is necessary to 
understand the institutional structures and dynamics of the single 
reporting frameworks, and which issues they purport to disclose. This 
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paper tackles these issues providing the first academic analysis of the ESG 
factors disclosure framework elaborated by the Sustainable Stock 
Exchanges Initiative – a project developed since 2009 under the aegis of 
the United Nations – and the World Federation of Exchanges – the stock 
exchanges and clearing houses trade association.  
In order to understand how and why the analyzed disclosure 
framework was produced, the paper develops an original conceptual 
framework that takes into account the nature of indicators as technologies 
of global governance, the “four actors” model advanced by Büthe and the 
role of transnational financial associations in the production of global 
governance rules. Using this theoretical framework, three distinct 
contributions are made. First, the paper provides a historical and political 
analysis of this new framework that is able to explain its adoption and 
implementation, disentangling ESG factors disclosure from corporate 
social responsibility and socially responsible investment. Second, it 
analyzes how the articulated structure of the actors involved in the 
production of the framework determined its content and the underlying 
concept of sustainability. Finally, it analyses why the structure of the 
actors involved and the specific conception of ESG factors disclosure 
hinder full and accurate information disclosure and narrow down the 
concept of sustainability embedded into the indicators. While the analysis 
is specific to the Sustainable Stock Exchange Initiative and the World 
Federation of Exchanges indicators, the theoretical model can be 
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“Sustainability” surely figures amongst the most discussed themes by 
corporate lawyers and policymakers at the global level in the last years. As 
elusive as the concept can be, the sense of urgency surrounding climate 
change and environmental considerations is clearly the main driver behind 
this trend. The burgeoning levels of inequality that have contributed to the 
crisis of representative democracy, not only in the global north, come 
second. The intention of pulling off from the Paris Agreement by major 
countries has only intensified the debate around the topic and has offered 
global investors and corporations an occasion to take a leadership role as 
main actors in the struggle against climate change.  
After the Great Financial Crisis,1 corporate social responsibility and 
sustainable investing have become mainstream through the reframing of 
unsustainable practices as business risks.2 Therefore, the necessity to 
provide investors3 with reliable data and metrics to evaluate these risks4 
has spurred a call for harmonization and standardization in ESG issues 
reporting focused on financially material factors.5 In fact, it is widely 
assessed that the existing voluntary reporting schemes fail in providing 
 
 
1  In its launch-discourse for the SSEI, the then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon himself 
connected the financial crisis and environmental issues with the necessity for businesses to care about 
ESG factors. See Ban Ki-Moon, UN Secretary-General on Sustainable Stock Exchanges, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=155&v=uLRs0psIpKI. Moreover, the renewed attention 
to environmental issues and rising inequality have increased potential business risks for firms.  
2  BlackRock, Viewpoint, Exploring ESG: A Practitioners Perspective (June 2016), 
http://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-fi/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-exploring-esg-a-
practitioners-perspective-june-2016.pdf (stating that “Environmental, social, and governance issues are 
integral to our investment stewardship activities, as the majority of our clients are saving for long-term 
goals. It is over the long-term that ESG factors – ranging from climate change to diversity to board 
effectiveness – have real and quantifiable financial impacts. Our risk analysis extends across all sectors 
and geographies, helping us identify companies lagging behind peers on ESG issues”).  
3  Whilst the socially responsible investor and impact investor community has grown 
exponentially in the last decade, the provision of reliable ESG information is now requested even by 
the generality of investors that do not target any specific non-financial impact, Daniel C. Esty & 
Quentin Karpilow, Harnessing Investor Interest in Sustainability: The Next Frontier in Environmental 
Information Regulation, 36 YALE LJ 628-629 (2019). 
4  Cynthia A. Williams & Jill E. Fish, SEC Rulemaking Petition 9-12 (2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2018/petn4-730.pdf (arguing that in the US, corporations struggle 
to provide decision useful information and company’s voluntary disclosure is insufficient to meet 
investors’ needs). 















investors with decision-useful information.6 Corporate social 
responsibility and socially responsible investment have been rebranded as 
ESG factors considerations and have changed in their substance. The 
“doing good while doing well” approach7 has been partially substituted by 
business risk considerations8 and investment opportunities linked to ESG 
issues. Exchanges,9 investors and financial regulators10 have called for 
ESG factors disclosure, rather than NGOs, workers or consumers. 
The call for elaborating ESG metrics disclosure has been taken up also 
by a project developed since 2009 under the aegis of the United Nations. 
The Sustainable Stock Exchanges Initiative (henceforth, SSEI) aimed 
expressly to elaborate a model guidance for ESG reporting to investors in 
collaboration with exchanges around the world and other crucial 
international business organizations and CSR advocates (UNCTAD, UN 
Global Compact, UNEPFI, PRI). This model guidance has been 
complemented with key performance indicators in 201511 by the World 
Federation of Exchanges (henceforth, WFE), which is the international 
association of exchanges and represents the “voice of the global market 
infrastructure.”12 These indicators have been eventually revised in the 
summer of 2018.13 
Most of the corporate law and financial economics analysis of 
 
 
6  Virginia Harper Ho, Nonfinancial Risk Disclosure and the Costs of Private Ordering 11, 
Univ. Oslo Fac. Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 1, 2018, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3108363. 
7  The historical development from “doing good to do good” to “doing good to do well” is 
analyzed by David Vogel, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE 17-24 (2005). 
8  The practice of risk identification depends crucially on evaluation practices that have a 
relational character, see Asa Boholm & Hervé Corvellec, The role of Valuation Practices for Risk 
Identification, in RISKWORK: ESSAYS ON THE ORGANIZATIONAL LIFE OF RISK MANAGEMENT 110 
(Michael Power ed., 2016). 
9  Exchanges fundamentally operate as trading systems and contribute to the construction of 
the market through data dissemination and order execution. The regulatory functions of exchanges 
concern both trading activities and listed corporations, RUBEN LEE, RUNNING THE WORLD'S MARKETS 
87 (2011). 
10  SSEI, 2018 Report on Progress 7 (2018), http://www.sseinitiative.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/SSE_On_Progress_Report_FINAL.pdf. 
11  WFE, Exchange Guidance & Recommendation (2015), https://www.world-
exchanges.org/storage/app/media/research/Studies_Reports/WFE%20ESG%20Recommendation%20
Guidance%20and%20Metrics%20Oct%202015.pdf. 
12 WFE, The World Federation of Exchanges Admits Six New Members (2018), 
https://www.world-exchanges.org/news/articles/world-federation-exchanges-admits-six-new-members 
(the sentence is attributed to Nandini Sukumar, WFE CEO). 
13 WFE, ESG Guidance and Metrics (2018), 
https://www.intercontinentalexchange.com/publicdocs/WFE_ESG_Recommendation_Guidance_and_
Metrics.pdf. 











sustainability focus on how corporations or investors which take into 
account ESG issues perform,14 or how to technically provide meaningful 
information to investors.15 At the same time, ESG factors disclosure is 
deemed a crucial tool that would foster a reallocation of capital towards 
sustainable corporations. Through these lenses, ESG factors are seen as 
risks to avoid or business opportunities to exploit. However, these studies 
do not always delve into the structure and content of the metrics developed 
to assess sustainability corporate performance.  
This paper disentangles ESG factors disclosure from corporate social 
responsibility and socially responsible investment in order to shed light on 
the architecture and institutional dynamics of non-financial factors 
disclosure and their assessment as business risks. Delving into the 
genealogy of the SSEI and the WFE schemes as a case study allows to cast 
a more nuanced light on the concept of the “sustainable corporation” and 
its exact meaning. Since disclosed information serves as a basis to build 
the category of the sustainable corporation, the analysis of this dynamic is 
crucial to navigate the alleged new reconciliation between corporate 
activities and sustainability. Moreover, the analysis of the indicators 
production process makes it possible to understand the power dynamics 
underlying ESG factors disclosure and provides insights on how the 
allocation of regulatory responsibilities crucially determines outcomes in 
the design of the framework that is supposed to guide the reallocation of 
capital in line with sustainability imperatives. 
In order to analyze ESG and sustainability disclosure and its specific 
characteristics, the paper provides the first investigation of the SSEI and 
WFE frameworks for reporting ESG issues to investors. Attention is 
devoted to the development of this new global infrastructure for ESG 
considerations reporting, which are the forces behind it and how it 
produces knowledge and governance effects. In fact, it is impossible to 
explain the emergence of this new paradigm and how it is built without 
understanding the underlying institutional dynamics and the legal 
framework into which the main actors navigate. This analysis sheds light 
on how global governance regimes are produced, how stock exchanges are 
main actors of financial market regulation and how the concept of 
sustainability is built according to the logic of the players involved.  
 
 
14 For reviews of these studies see infra note 224. 
15 Discussions about how to provide meaningful information to investors can be found in Daniel 
C. Esty & Quentin Karpilow, Harnessing Investor Interest in Sustainability: The Next Frontier in 
Environmental Information Regulation, 36 YALE LJ 625 (2019); Virginia Harper Ho, supra note 6; Jill 













To describe the functioning of this disclosure framework it is 
insufficient to think of investors as demanders and users of ESG issues 
information and corporations as the recalcitrant target of these metrics. In 
fact, this supply and demand scheme disguises the role played by most of 
the actors involved and reduces hotly contested political matters to 
technical issues. Furthermore, that would risk reducing ad unum the 
conflicting interests existing within general and ample categories as 
“corporations” and “investors”. Finally, this simple model doesn’t say 
much on the relationship between ESG issues that investors are concerned 
with and the more general idea of the sustainable corporation, that is 
supposed to solve some of the aforementioned global challenges.  
The paper advances a composited theoretical framework for assessing 
the production of transnational global governance, complementing three 
central insights. First, the conceptualization of indicators as technologies 
of global governance.16 Second, the conceptual model developed by 
Büthe17 that describes four sets of groups to understand the production and 
use of indicators. Third, the theorization of the role of transnational 
financial associations as fundamental institutions for the expansion of 
global finance and production of corporate governance regulation in 
several arenas. Complementing these insights allows us to understand both 
the dynamics and power effects internal to the actors involved in the 
production and use of the indicator as well as the more political role that 
the production of the indicator has at the global level. 
The paper makes several contributions to existing scholarship: (i) it 
identifies why the call for ESG factors disclosure emerged, how it differs 
from CSR and SRI, and which is the underlying concept of sustainability 
that is embedded into the indicators; (ii) the proposed conceptual 
framework allows to provide the first analysis of the genealogy and 
production of the SSEI-WFE indicators, its political economy, and how 
and why the allocation of regulatory responsibilities deeply affected the 
final indicators. Moreover, the framework can be deployed to study other 
sustainability issues disclosure frameworks; (iii) finally, the limits and 
contradictions of business risk ESG factors disclosure are individuated as 
rooted in the political economy of the modern corporation, whilst it is 
discussed how third parties interested in a broader concept of 
 
 
16   Kevin E. Davis, Benedict Kingsbury & Sally Engle Merry, Introduction: Global 
Governance by Indicators, in GOVERNANCE BY INDICATORS 3 (Kevin E. Davis et al. eds., 2012). 
17  Tim Büthe, Beyond Supply and Demand: A Political-Economic Conceptual Model,  in 
GOVERNANCE BY INDICATORS 29 (Kevin E. Davis et al. eds., 2012). 











sustainability should interact with business-focused ESG factors 
disclosure. 
The argument proceeds as follows: Part II provides a brief history of 
CSR and SRI in order to analyze how the shift to business-case ESG 
reporting consummated and why it represents a significant turn. Part III 
presents the analytical framework adopted. Part IV assesses the production 
of the SSEI 2015 model guidance and part V addresses the WFE 
production of key performance indicators. Part VI considers the 
implications of the analysis provided. 
II. FROM CSR TO SRI AND ESG INDICATORS: ACRONYMS AND BEYOND 
Between the end of the seventies and the beginning of the eighties, a 
deep turn affected corporate culture and managerial behavior in the US 
and the UK, bringing to the forefront shareholder value maximization18 as 
the guiding principle for the management of corporations. Agency 
theory,19 a branch of neo-institutional economics,20 formally articulated 
several reasons why managing a corporation with the sole objective of 
maximizing shares value turned out to be in the interest of society as a 
whole.21  
A prominent line of research carried out by four financial economists,22 
argued that legal origins and legal rules were crucial in financial market 
development and tested these assumptions empirically23. Whilst these 
 
 
18  William Lazonick & Mary O’Sullivan, Maximizing Shareholder Value: A New Ideology for 
Corporate Governance, 29 ECON. & SOC’Y 13 (2000).  
19  The foundational article of agency theory is Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of 
the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Capital Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
20  The transaction costs approach together with agency theory and property rights constitute the 
bulk and the theoretical toolkit of neo-institutional theory, Dieter Plehwe, Modes of Economic 
Governance: The Dynamics of Governance at the national and Firm Level, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE 387, 393 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2012). 
21  Indeed, contrary to agency theorists claim, efficiency does not correspond to social welfare. 
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholders and Social Welfare, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
489 (2013). Whilst agency theory and agency costs remain the cornerstones of the neo-classical theory 
of the corporation even today, that theory has enriched itself of other strands of thinking. Simon 
Deakin, The Corporation in Legal Studies, in THE CORPORATION. A CRITICAL MULTI-DISCIPLINARY 
HANDBOOK 47, 55-56 (Grietje Baars & André Spicer eds., 2017). Despite the strictly micro-economic 
analysis carried out by neo-classical corporate law scholars, it is important to underline that the 
validity of the theory rests on a narrow partial equilibrium framework. William W. Bratton & Simone 
M. Sepe, Corporate Law and the Myth of Efficient Market Control, in CORNELL L. REV. forthcoming, 
18 (2019).  
22  The reference is to the many foundational papers of the so-called “gang of four,” Rafael La 
Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny. 
23  A different approach to explain shareholders and workers’ legal protection is the so-called 













studies did not hold further empirical tests,24 they constituted the basis for 
exporting rules that empowered shareholders all around the globe.25 Such 
an export was sustained proactively by international organizations, namely 
the World Bank by its doing business report26 and the OECD by its 
principles of corporate governance, and stock exchanges constituted a 
privileged place to implement rules outside of the formal legislative 
process.27 The “end of history” cultural humus28 provided the necessary 
political support for implementing these reforms even across the more 
social democratic continental Europe.29 
The main countertendency to that broad consensus was represented by 
team-production theory of the corporation30 and by corporate social 
responsibility (henceforth, CSR) advocates. Even if it is legitimate and 
indeed realistic to be doubtful about the real transformative force of CSR, 
the request for the adoption of ethical codes or best-practices by 
multinational enterprises represented a field for contestation of some of the 
 
 
hypothesis and characterizes in a more nuanced way the effects of legal reforms on market institutions, 
see Marianna Belloc & Ugo Pagano, Politics-Business Co-Evolution Paths: Workers’ Organization 
and Capitalist Concentration, 33 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 23-36 (2013).  
24  Dionysia Katelouzou & Mathias Siems, Disappearing paradigms in shareholder protection: 
Leximetric evidence for 30 countries, 1990-2013, 15 J. CORP. L. STUD.  27, 127 (2015); Holger 
Spamann, On The Insignificance and/or Endogeneity of La Porta et al’s ‘Anti-Director Rights Index’ 
Under Consistent Coding 8 (John Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business, Fellows’ discussion 
paper series, Paper No. 7, 2006), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=894301; Sofie 
Cool, The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the United States and Continental Europe: 
Distribution of Powers, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 697, 697 (2005).  
25  Deakin et al. demonstrate that there is no correlation between shareholders empowerment 
and capital market development: Simon Deakin, Prabirjit Sarkar & Mathias Siems, Is There a 
Relationship Between Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development?, 3 J.L. FIN. & ACC. 
115, 115 (2018); John Armour et al., Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development: An 
Empirical Test of the Legal Origin Hypothesis, 6 J. EMP. STUD. 343, 343 (2009); John C. Coffee, The 
Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Role of Law in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 
YALE L. J. 1, 59-66 (2011); BRIAN CHEFFINS, CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: BRITISH 
BUSINESS TRANSFORMED 35-40 (2010). 
26  It has been argued that the doing business report has contributed to the spread of a narrow 
neo-liberal conception of the relationship between law and development, Tor Krever, Quantifying 
Law: Legal Indicator Projects and the Reproduction of Neo-Liberal Common Sense, 34 THIRD 
WORLD Q. 131, 140-42 (2013). 
27  Hans Christiansen & Alissa Koldertsova, The Role of Stock Exchanges in Corporate 
Governance OECD, Working Paper No. 2009/1, 2009 1-2, available at 
https://www.oecd.org/finance/financial-markets/43169104.pdf.  
28  With regard to corporate law, the most notable contribution in this vein has been an article 
by Henry Hansmann and Reinier. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for 
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L. REV. 439 (2000). 
29  Katelouzou & Siems, supra note 25. 
30  Margaret M. Blair & Lynn Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. 
REV. 248, 249 (1999). 











most disturbing sides of financialized and global capitalism.31 Moreover, 
the expansion of transnational trade and the creation of global value chains 
and global production networks32 as the primary organizational structures 
for transnational production33 posited a peremptory challenge to the 
effectiveness of state-centered and national regulation. At least in this 
regard, ethical codes34 and best practices adopted by transnational 
corporations seemed a minimal, but nonetheless beneficial, way to 
approach regulation of transnational entities.  
Apart from defensive CSR adopted after a scandal or because of the 
pressure of activists, some business leaders embraced CSR and 
sustainability as a way of advertisement and legitimization or because of 
personal beliefs. It is necessary to stress that CSR involved a dialogue 
between the corporation and stakeholders, and that the political battles by 
NGOs were directed against determined business practices (about minors’ 
labor, human rights, deforestation and so on). In a world of empowered 
shareholders and of institutional investors, the companion to CSR was 
socially responsible investment (henceforth, SRI) that reflected a similar 
phenomenon but concerning investors. 
The following sections aim at explaining and comparing the different 
phenomena of CSR, SRI and how they interact with ESG reporting. 
Despite the recurrent conflation of these paradigms in the literature, 
disentangling them is necessary to fully appreciate the development of the 
transnational regulation about business-case ESG factors reporting. I 
contend that it is essential to differentiate peculiar features of all of them 
in order to clarify and understand the shift that ESG reporting has 
undergone in the last years and how this affects the approach of 
corporations towards ESG issues at the global level. Furthermore, this 
differentiation is crucial to understand how global actors that were 
skeptical towards ESG elements disclosure have been enrolled in the 
development of the framework.35  
 
 
31  SOL PICCIOTTO, REGULATING GLOBAL CORPORATE CAPITALISM 194 (2011). 
32  The distinction between the two forms and the debate in the literature is well explained by 
David L. Levy. See David L. Levy, Political Contestation in Global Production Networks, 33 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 943, 949-51 (2008).  
33  On global value chain see WILLIAM MILBERG & DEBORAH WINKLER, OUTSOURCING 
ECONOMICS: GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS IN CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT (2013). 
34  The role of ethical codes in institutional and neo-classical economic theory is discussed by 
Guglielmo Forges Davanzati.  GUGLIELMO FORGES DAVANZATI, ETHICAL CODES AND INCOME 
DISTRIBUTION (2006). 
35 Correspondingly, ESG valuation techniques should be accepted also within financial 













Finally, ESG factors disclosure is aimed at highlighting potential 
business opportunities or as a way to disclose risk factors. Therefore, it is 
necessary to take this risk-related role of ESG issues disclosure into 
account in order to understand how risk is created and accounted for, as 
well as how the political economy of the corporations and stock exchanges 
interact with risk factors. 
A. CSR 
A common definition of CSR does not exist, but the expression means 
different things to different actors. The main distinction that is generally 
drawn is the one between those who emphasize the voluntariness of the 
behavior and those who focus on the coexistence in business strategies of 
profitability and ethical, social and environmental considerations.36 For the 
purposes of this paper, we can overlook this distinction and generally 
define CSR as a set of business practices that do not focus solely on the 
improvement of the financial performance of the firm, but also on their 
score on a responsibility scale, that generally involves environmental and 
social considerations.37 Whilst the beneficial effects on corporate 
performance of these practices are debated and contested,38 it has been 
convincingly argued that if these practices were always value-enhancing 
they would have been spontaneously adopted by shareholders and 
managers,39 even conceding that in some cases market failures or 




and acceptance of ESG valuation within a big Swiss bank is provided by Stefan Leins, ‘Responsible 
Investment’: ESG and the Post-Crisis Ethical Order, ECON & SOC’Y (2020) 
36  Ans Kolk, The Social Responsibility of International Business: From Ethics and the 
Environment to CSR and Sustainable Development, 51 J. WORLD BUS. 23, 24 (2016). 
37  CSR practices are criticized both by right-wing and left-wing scholars: right-wingers critique 
them because they interfere with the primary purpose of the corporations: enhancing shareholders 
value. Left-wingers are skeptical because CSR is constrained by the profit-seeking purpose of the 
corporation and, whatever the real benefits, serves as a powerful legitimizing tool. See Luc Fransen, 
Embedding the Multinational Corporation in Transnational Sustainability Governance, in THE 
CORPORATION: A CRITICAL MULTI-DISCIPLINARY HANDBOOK 257, 259 (Grietje Baars & André 
Spicer eds., 2017).  
38  See Archie B. Carroll & Kareen M. Shabana, The Business Case for Corporate Social 
Responsibility: A Review of Concepts, Research and Practice, 12 INT’L J MGMT. REV. 85, 85 (2010). 
39  Lorraine Talbot, Trying to Save the World with Company Law? Some Problems, 36 LEGAL 
STUD. 513, 518 (2016) (providing a detailed account of the business case for CSR). 











Whilst CSR practices have been known for a long time,40 CSR arose to 
prominence both as a result of contestation of corporate behavior in the 
‘90s41 and as a strategy of corporate marketization at the global level42. 
CSR (and after that SRI) has been primarily used to solve a potentially 
unmanageable problem: how can corporations – particularly when they act 
through global value chains or global production networks43 – be held 
accountable for the actions committed in a third-world foreign country?44 
It is clear that the investment flow is at least partially advantageous to the 
host country and that the country itself lacks the means to tackle harmful 
actions,45 because of the imbalance of economic power and the potential 
availability of an easy exit strategy for the corporation.46 CSR represents a 
form of private regulation and governance that does not derive its 
authority from government47 and presents a complicated relationship with 
 
 
40  See Herman Aguinis & Ante Glavas, What We Know and Don’t Know about Corporate 
Social Responsibility: A Review and Research Agenda, 38 J. MGMT. 932, 933 (2012) (providing a 
comprehensive historical reconstruction). 
41  “In the mid-1990s, CSR became a battle cry of rights organizations, a concept representing 
consumer expectations, an issue debated by national governments and international bodies, a topic of 
intense scientific research, and eventually a crucial component of corporate operations.” Ronen 
Shamir, Capitalism, Governance and Authority: The Case of Corporate Social Responsibility, 6 
ANNU. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 531, 537 (2010). 
42  This is well represented by the survey of CSR literature in management academic journal by 
Pisani et. al. Niccolò Pisani et. al., How Global Is International CSR Research? Insights and 
Recommendations from a Systematic Review, 52 J. WORLD BUS. 591, 595 (2017). 
43  Frederick Mayer & Gary Gereffi, Regulation and Economic Globalization: Prospects and 
Limits of Private Governance, 12 BUS. & POL. 1, 4 (2010). 
44  A partial exception were legal suits filed in the US under the Alien Tort Claims Act. See 
Doreen McBarnet & Patrick Schmidt, Corporate Accountability Through Creative Enforcement—
Human Rights, the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Limits of Legal Impunity, in THE NEW CORPORATE 
ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 148 (Doreen McBarnet, 
Aurora Voiculescu & Tom Campbell eds., 2007), and Hugh King, Corporate Accountability Under the 
Alien Tort Claims Act, 9 MEL. J. INT’L L. 472 (2008). 
45  This inability is present even when the host country has strict laws on the books but lacks an 
appropriate enforcement apparatus. Mayer & Gereffi, supra note 44, at 1. It has been argued that 
governmental and international organizations’ standards-setting functions for cross-border economic 
activity have been hampered for two reasons: (i) the difficulty to enroll developing countries because 
of the perceived negative effects of more stringent regulation on competitiveness and foreign 
investments inflows, and (ii) the possibility to challenge these standards according to WTO law. 
Fransen, supra note 37, at 258. Such an argument is also developed by Bartley, who reports that, in 
order to support sustainable forestry, certain trade restrictions would have been illegal under 
international treaties but a private labeling program would have been permissible. Tim Bartley, 
Certifying Forests and Factories: States, Social Movements, and the Rise of Private Regulation in the 
Apparel and Forest Product Field, 31 POL. & SOC. 433, 447-48 (2003). 
46  Such an exit strategy is even easier when global production is organized along value chains 
through contracts, and the local manufacturer has not developed specific expertise that is not easily 
replaceable. 













formal public regulation.48 Whilst it is debatable that every function 
carried out through private governance mechanisms in the CSR context 
could be carried out by the State, it is also true that CSR regulation 
generally extends to traditionally state-occupied regulatory areas. 
The first reason why the 90s saw the explosion of CSR is the 
internationalization of trade and investment in that period.49 As Vogel 
writes:  
What explains the growing importance of CSR since the early 
1990s? Much of the answer is linked to the expansion of global and 
national markets. At the international level, the trend is driven by 
the growth of world trade and investment. At the national level, it 
reflects increasing privatization and economic deregulation. While 
these developments have produced many economic benefits, they 
have also generated dissatisfaction with some of the consequences 
of globalization and liberalization—as reflected most dramatically 
in the demonstrations mounted by protesters at many international 
business and political meetings.50  
The second reason is probably the end of the bipolar world, the 
historical defeat of socialism and the compression of workers’ political 
power in the ‘80s: CSR has sometimes evolved and reinforced the 
“neoliberal turn”51 rather than being a countervailing force.52 
CSR has sometimes had an adversarial stance and generally involves a 
dialogue (or conflict) between the corporation and some social groups that 
are external53 to the corporation itself.54 The typical cases of adversarial 
 
 
48  Virginia Harper Ho, Beyond Regulation: A Comparative Look at State-Centric Corporate 
Social Responsibility and the Law in China, 46 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. 375 (2013) (analyzing the 
relationship between governments and CSR around the world with a focus on the Chinese experience). 
49  In general, “[t]he move towards private governance is best seen as a response to societal 
pressures spawned by economic globalization and by the inadequacy of public governance institutions 
in addressing them.” Mayer & Gereffi, supra note 43, at 1.  
50  Vogel, supra note 7, at 8. 
51  For a political-economic history of the neo-liberal turn, see generally DAVID HARVEY, A 
BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM (1st ed. 2005). 
52  About the co-evolution of CSR and the neoliberal turn in the UK, see Daniel Kinderman, 
‘Free Us Up So We Can Be Responsible!’ The Co-Evolution of Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Neo-Liberalism in the UK, 1977-2010, 10 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 29 (2012). 
53  For the purpose of this paper it is not necessary to distinguish between the firm as the 
productive entity and the corporation as the legal structure. Contra Jean-Philippe Robé, The Legal 
Structure of the Firm, 1 ACCT. ECON. & L. 1, 5-10 (2011). Such a distinction would naturally change 
what is external and internal to the corporation, specifically with regard to stockholders.  











CSR arise either when an NGO mounts a public campaign against a 
specific corporation because of determined practices, or because 
regulation in a specific area is required after a scandal.55 In other cases, 
directors voluntarily and spontaneously engage in responsible behavior:56 
the most prominent example is the commitment to the UN Global 
Compact by CEOs of many giant corporations. Even if also in this case the 
adoption of responsible practices is still part of a broader political 
economic context where corporations compete for authority with states, 
international organizations and NGOs,57 the bulk of this second kind of 
CSR practices is characterized by their voluntariness and the fact that 
business leaders are adopting determinate practices in an unconstrained 
way in order to enhance the image58 of the corporation.59  
Even when the adoption of CSR measures is not the outcome of a 
struggle on a specific issue with third parties, it is nonetheless directed to 
third parties;60 while these practices are also justified as enhancing 
corporate performance, they are not exclusively directed at that. Virtue,61 
moral value judgments and the recognition that responsibility involves a 
 
 
54  For a taxonomy of the different types of CSR and the tendency to conceptualize CSR as the 
internalization of externalities in carrying out business activity, see Graeme Auld, Steven Bernstein & 
Benjamin Cashore, The New Corporate Social Responsibility, 33 ANN. REV. OF ENV’T & RESOURCES 
413, 415-18 (2008). 
55  In these cases, the corporation is forced to adopt the code of conductor to change its business 
behavior because of public pressure and the risks of damaging its image. An express link between 
public contestation and the birth of businesses’ codes of conduct in the 90s is made by Mayer and 
Gereffi. See Mayer & Gereffi, supra note 43, at 5. 
56  Stephen Brammer, Gregory Jackson & Dirk Matten, Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Institutional Theory: New Perspectives on Private Governance, 10 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 2 (2012) 
(providing a historical institutional understanding of the emergence and content of CSR practices). 
57  The adoption of voluntary CSR practices generally interacts, is supported by, or relies on 
international organizations legal instruments, governmental authority and private law. Shamir, supra 
note 42, at 542. 
58  This second kind of CSR is linked to the transformation of reputation from an ethical 
category to an organizing concept crossing several management areas. Michael Power, ORGANIZED 
UNCERTAINTY: DESIGNING A WORLD OF RISK MANAGEMENT 135 (2007). 
59  Power remarks that: “In a space between two logics, fears of legal liability and reputational 
damage on the one hand and management opportunities for enhanced reputation and shareholder value 
on the other, earlier critical discourses of CSR have been transformed, interlaced with rhetorics [sic] of 
strategic significance, and have 
acquired greater currency within large organizations.” Id. at 134. It is of course possible that these 
practices correspond to the subjective preferences of managers and CEOs: nonetheless, such a personal 
preference distinction is not particularly useful in order to analyze CSR as a structural phenomenon at 
the global level.  
60  Id. at 134 (noting that the concept of reputation has mediated a transition from a traditional 
conception of critical CSR to a novel one based on meeting society’s expectation as a praxis of risk 
management). 
61  Vogel, supra note 7 at 2. (“[B]usiness virtue – that is, practices that improve the workplace 













relationship between the corporation and stakeholders accompany the 
adoption of responsible practices. Despite the broad adoption of these 
frameworks, they have been deemed ineffective to protect human rights 
and the environment because they lack enforceability apparatuses and 
often focus more on reporting rather than on substantial outcomes.62 
Furthermore, voluntary CSR deals mainly with win-win situations, often 
missing the nature of the capitalist production and accumulation process,63 
and generally win-lose situations64 are neglected.65 Voluntary CSR, apart 
from being read as propaganda and panacea, can be read as an instrument 
for capital to commodify its own crisis:66 in order to access new markets – 
as the ones once occupied by public welfare – or to produce new – at least 
partially contested technologies – the corporation needs to present itself as 
responsible, legitimate and sustainable.67  Finally, the theory underlying 
CSR is developed on Habermas’ work on deliberative democracy68 and the 
accent on the deliberative process tends to avoid the problem of political 
authority and enforcement.69  
What we could take away from this short discussion and that is 
important to understand the new ESG reporting frameworks is that CSR: 
(i) involves some form of discussion of business practices and their effects 
on third parties; (ii) even when it is value-enhancing, it is not primarily 
justified as a business strategy; (iii) it is enacted by corporations and is not 
primarily addressed to investors; and (iv) it is generally – albeit sometimes 





62 Subhabrata B. Banerjee, A Critical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility: Towards a 
Global Governance Framework, 10 CRITICAL PERSP. INT’L BUS. 84, 87 (2014). 
63 Peter Fleming, Bad Parresia: CSR and Corporate Mystification Today, in THE CORPORATION. 
A CRITICAL MULTI-DISCIPLINARY HANDBOOK 411, 413 (Grietje Baars & André Spicer eds., 2017). 
64 When the pursuit of a responsible behavior could harm profits or when business activity is in 
contrast with social and environmental interests. 
65 Subhabrata B. Banerjee, Transnational Power and Translocal Governance: The Politics of 
Corporate Responsibility, 71 Hum. Rel. 796, 800 (2018). 
66 Peter Fleming and Mark Jones, THE END OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: CRISIS & 
CRITIQUE 110 (2013).  
67 Id. at 110. 
68 Andreas G. Scherer, Theory Assessment and Agenda Setting in Political CSR: A Critical 
Theory Perspective, 20 INT’L J. MGMT. 387 (2017); Jedrzej G. Frynas & Sian Stephens, Political 
Corporate Social Responsibility: Reviewing Theories and Setting New Agendas, 18 INT’L J. MGMT 
REV. 483 (2015). 
69 Banerjee, supra note 65, at 801. 












Whilst the CSR movement focuses on corporations and their impact on 
third parties, the SRI wave focuses on investors and their investment 
practices.70 SRI theory and practices gained momentum during the 
apartheid period in South Africa, as activists called for a complete boycott 
of businesses that invested in South Africa or for divestment from those 
that did not conform to certain standards,71 the so-called Sullivan 
Principles.72 SRI too is not well defined, and sharp disagreement exists 
about its scope and frontiers.73 For the purposes of this paper, I define SRI 
as an investment strategy that combines financial purposes with investors’ 
social values.74 Whilst this definition does not distinguish between value-
alignment investing and impact investing,75 it is sufficiently broad to 
include both and to illustrate how the pillars upon which SRI is based 
differ from the ESG reporting debate.  
One of the reasons why SRI became relevant has been the enormous 
increase of the savings managed by institutional investors and the hybrid 
position that pension funds play: they should maximize return on 
investment for the benefit of workers, and at the same time they risk 
supporting business strategies ultimately prejudicial for workers.76 SRI is, 
at least partially, the other side of the CSR coin. Corporations adopt 
socially responsible practices, while investors pride themselves of taking 
into account these business models in their investment decisions. Even in 
the SRI case, the point of tension in the debate about its real efficacy lies 
at the border between the win-win situation (when social responsibility has 
a positive effect on profits) and the win-lose one.77  
Recently, the SRI framework for investment has started to be partially 
 
 
70  Adolf Berle, Modern functions of the corporate system, 62 COL. L. REV. 433 (1962). 
71  Max Schanzenbach & Robert Sitkoff, The Law and Economics of Environmental, Social, 
and Governance Investing by a Fiduciary 7 (Harvard John Olin Discussion Paper, Paper No. 971, 
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3244665. 
72  David Hauck, Meg Voorhes & GLenn Goldberg, TWO DECADES OF DEBATE: THE 
CONTROVERSY OVER U.S. COMPANIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 7 (1983). 
73  See Paul Brest, Ronald J. Gilson & Mark A. Wolfson, How Investors Can (and Can’t) 
Create Social Value 7-9 (ECGI Working Paper Series in Law, Paper 394, 2018) (Analysis of the 
terminology concerning socially responsible investing practices). 
74  Maria J. Munoz-Torres, Maria A. Fernandez Izquierdo, & Maria R. Balaguer-Franch, The 
Social Responsibility Performance of Ethical and Solidarity Funds: An Approach to the Case of Spain, 
13 BUS. ETHICS 200 (2004).  
75  Brest, Gilson & Wolfson, supra note 73, at 2. 
76  See Susanne Soederberg, CORPORATE POWER AND OWNERSHIP IN CONTEMPORARY 
CAPITALISM 93-98 (2011) (author highlights the limits to pension funds’ activism).  













decoupled from moral and ethical factors and considered as an investment 
strategy that promises to bring higher risk-adjusted returns. Certain 
authors have therefore argued that SRI has been rebranded as ESG, with 
the addition of the “G” because of the consideration of corporate 
governance matters that were external to the SRI “movement”. 78  Hence, 
they have labeled purely altruistic motivated investments as “collateral 
benefit ESG”, and the investments meant to improve returns taking into 
account environmental and social factors as “risk-return ESG”.79 Whilst 
this distinction grasps a fundamental turn in SRI, it also demonstrates that 
there is considerable confusion about the terminology and that 
sustainability,80 ESG and SRI are often adopted interchangeably. This 
terminology fuzziness mirrors the diversity practices and blended 
discourses by investors themselves about their activities, but risks to 
bewilder the distinction between a purely financial investment strategy and 
a more comprehensive one. Moreover, it is important to stress and to keep 
in mind the distinction between an investment strategy adopted by an 
institutional investor, and the reporting framework through which 
corporations advertise their activities and disclose potential risks. 
From the above discussion the main characteristics of SRI can be 
qualified as follows: (i) it is enacted by investors and has the ultimate 
purpose of changing business behavior; (ii) it can be justified as value-
enhancing but is not exclusively focused on returns; (iii) it is moral based.  
The missing link in this picture is the connection between the practices 
adopted by businesses and the investment decision. In fact, in order to take 
social responsibility into account, investors have to rely on detailed 
information that can be adequately priced.81 Providing such information 
becomes therefore crucial to businesses: on the one side, this allows them 
to access and to capture the resources held by socially responsible 
investors; on the other side, the publicization of socially responsible 
practices has always been a marketization technique. Nevertheless, one of 
the obstacles to the production of a harmonized reporting framework has 
been the perception that both CSR and SRI are not strictly financial, that 
 
 
78  Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 72, at 3.  
79  Id. at 4. 
80  Brest, Gilson & Wolfson, supra note 73, at 6. 
81  Galit Sarfaty, Measuring Corporate Accountability through Global Indicators, in THE QUIET 
POWER OF INDICATORS, 103, 108 (Sally Engle Merry, Kevin E. Davis & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 
2015) (In this regard, the GRI motto is “What you cannot measure, you cannot manage. What you 
cannot manage, you cannot change.” As explained by Sarfaty, this motto has motivated the GRI since 
its foundation.). 











they go beyond what the generality of businesses care about and could 
hamper profits.  
The different purposes pursued by the standards-setters led to the 
production of several private reporting frameworks that put the accent on 
different aspects of social responsibility. The next paragraph demonstrates 
that the mainstreaming of ESG considerations – meant as business risks 
and strategic opportunities – created the occasion for the establishment of 
a framework at the global level. It also argues that this standard for 
reporting on ESG matters substantially differentiates the business-case for 
ESG reporting and investing from both CSR and SRI: ESG factors 
reporting deals with issues that are material, and therefore financially 
relevant, for corporations.82 Quite to the contrary, moral issues and 
stakeholders’ interests are not crucial for these reports. The failure to 
appreciate such a departure could provoke mistakes in the assessment of 
the configuration of power that these new frameworks entail.   
C. ESG Factors Reporting  
The market for responsible investment has considerably grown over 
time and, in general, investors that consider sustainability issues have 
grown dramatically in the last years.83 In 2016, they were estimated to 
manage $ 22.89 trillion globally;84 at the start of 2018, this figure rose to $ 
30.7 trillion.85 Nonetheless, companies around the world have struggled to 
provide investors, civil society and consumers with useful and realistic 
information.86 Unquestionably, sustainability reports are addressed to 
different constituencies and have therefore diverging purposes: showing 
corporate resilience and growth when they are addressed to investors; 
marketizing and ameliorating corporate image when they are targeted to 
 
 
82  Robert G. Eccles & Svetlana Klimenko, The Investor Revolution, in HAR. BUS. REV. (May-
Jun 2019), available at https://hbr.org/2019/05/the-investor-revolution. 
83  Id. 
84  Global Sustainable Investment Alliance, The Global Sustainable Investment Review  (March 
2016), 7-8, http://www.gsi-alliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/GSIA_Review_2016.pdf.   
85  Global Sustainable Investment Alliance, The Global Sustainable Investment Review  8 
(2018) http://www.gsi-alliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/GSIR_Review2018.3.28.pdf. 
However, the number is contested: i.e. JP Morgan is reported to believe that only $ 3 trillion are real 
ESG investments. See also Gillian Tett, Ethical Investing Has Reached a Tipping Point (Financial 
Times, Jun 18, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/7d64d1d8-91a6-11e9-b7ea-60e35ef678d2. 
86  Klaus Dingwerth & Margot Eichinger, Tamed Transparency: How Information Disclosure 
under the Global Reporting Initiative Fails to Empower, 10 GLOBAL ENV. POL. 74, 88 (2010). 
Furthermore, NGOs and social activists barely look at sustainability reports. See Halina S. Brown, 
Martin de Jong, & David Levy, Building Institutions Based on Information Disclosure: Lessons from 













consumers and civil society. In general, the different purposes reflect the 
ambivalence of CSR and SRI and it is not surprising that these reports are 
found to be insufficient and sometimes aleatory. Different private 
frameworks that address at least partially different targets have been 
established87 over time to report about “sustainability issues.88 
Nevertheless, determining the target audience of the reporting initiative is 
crucial89, and most likely it identifies the determining variable that shapes 
the report.90  
The standards adopted by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)91, in 
their fourth version (G4), were the most widely used until the adoption of 
the GRI Standards at the end of 2016.92 Anyway, as the GRI website 
affirms, “for organizations already reporting following G4, impacts [of the 
new framework] on the reporting process should be relatively minor”.93 
The GRI was founded in Boston by the Coalition for Environmentally 
Responsible Economies94 and the Tellus Institute and was initially 
supported by the United Nations Environment Program.95 The institutional 
structure of the GRI is, therefore, a mixed one, where investors, companies 
and civil society representatives are brought together96 to set the standards 
 
 
87  Brown, de Jong, & Levy, supra note 86, at 573. 
88  See Mahmoud Ezzamel & Keith Robson, The Corporation in Accounting, in THE 
CORPORATION. A CRITICAL MULTI-DISCIPLINARY HANDBOOK 180, 188 (Grietje Baars & André 
Spicer ed., 2017) (providing a brief survey of the intellectual history of ESG accounting and 
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89  Gill North, Corporate Sustainability Practices and Regulation: Existing Frameworks and 
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Du Plessis & Chee Keong Low ed., 2017). 
90  Robert G. Eccles & Svetlana Klimenko, supra, note 82 (remarking that the new sustainable 
reporting and investing movement focuses on financially material and relevant factors and 
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91  KPMG, The Road Ahead: The KPMG Survey of Corporate Responsibility reporting 6 (2017) 
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92  The GRI Standards have completely substituted the G4 as of July 1, 2018; after that date, a 
report based on the G4 is not considered as a GRI-report. GRI, Questions and Feedback, 
https://www.globalreporting.org/standards/questions-and-feedback/transitioning-from-g4-to-gri-
standards/. 
93  Id. 
94  Ceres is a network of NGOs, investors and companies with the specific aim of fostering 
sustainability in business practices. See Ceres, About Us, https://www.ceres.org/about-us. 
95  North, supra note 90, at 149. 
96  Galit Sarfaty, Regulating Through Numbers: A Case Study of Corporate Sustainability 
Reporting, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 575, 593 (2013) (describing the institutional structure of GRI). 











along which companies should report.97 Notwithstanding the mixed 
stakeholders composition of the GRI, the late amendments tend to depict 
ESG reporting as mainstream.98 
The GRI standards are voluntary and incremental, and corporations can 
decide along which standards to report99 and most of the third party’s 
audits on the report are limited only to the reported indicators,100 with 
obvious picking effects on the selected standards and the exclusion of the 
variables where performance is weak.101 Moreover, the degree to which 
GRI reports represent reality is contended. In a study concerning the 
extractive sector, Brown et al. have found that reporting according to GRI 
guidelines has not specifically empowered civil society actors and not 
increased third-party accountability of corporations.102 Boiral and Henri 
have raised even more serious doubts about the possibility to accomplish 
the comparability of the sustainability score reported along GRI 
guidelines, which is one of the main aims of GRI.103 These empirical 
studies seem to support the claim that, whilst at the beginning the GRI 
aimed at fostering accountability to civil society by corporations,104 the 
institutionalization process of the organization involved a shift towards a 
more business-friendly sustainability issues service provider.105 Finally, 
even if the GRI is the most popular reporting framework, a recent survey 
of US S&P 500 corporations showed that only a minority of the sample 
 
 
97  Whilst the GRI was at the beginning aimed at the development of a voluntary framework for 
reporting, it has recently shifted towards hard law, helping states and stock exchanges to draft 
regulation. Id. at 111. 
98  North, supra note 90, at 149.  
99  Sarfaty, supra note 82, at 109. A corporation is not forced to report according to all of the 
several environmental and social indicators but can choose and pick amongst them. Apart from the 
cherry-picking and greenwashing effect, this possibility undermines the comparability of reports and 
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100  North, supra note 90, at 161. 
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ORG. SOC. 303 (2008). 
102  Brown, de Jong & Levy, supra note 87, at 572. 
103  See generally Olivier Boiral & Jean-François Henri, Is Sustainability Performance 
Comparable? A Study of GRI Reports of Mining Organizations, 56 BUS. & SOC’Y 283 (2017).  
104  David Levy, Halina S. Brown & Martin de Jong, The Contested Politics of Corporate 
Governance: The Case of the Global Reporting Initiative, 49 BUS. & SOC’Y 8 (2010). 
105  See Brown, de Jong & Levy, supra note 87, at 579. “GRI has come a long way from these 
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but it turned into a service organization. Not only has GRI failed to mobilize civil society groups but 













companies closely follows one reporting framework, with the majority 
either reporting according to two or more reporting standards or with only 
loose respect to a single framework.106  
Whilst the GRI are primarily addressed to corporations, the leading 
frameworks for detecting targets for socially responsible investors are the 
Impact Reporting and Investment Standards and the Global Impact 
Investing Rating System.107 Despite the differences with the GRI, even 
these frameworks have been criticized for marketizing social values and 
their northern-western centric governance structure.108 For investors, these 
indicators are not strictly linked to a business case for ESG and are not 
useful to a broader array of investors other than the explicitly 
“responsible” ones.  
Despite the promise to fulfill harmonization, the GRI has failed in this 
regard.109 Such a failure can be explained according to Fransen and 
Conzelmann’s theory about the factors that produce fragmented or 
cohesive transnational private regulation of sustainability standards.110 
Their comparative study, focusing on industrial characteristics of specific 
sectors and institutional design of sustainability standards, highlights that 
industrial concentration in the specific sector and the leniency of the 
standards and the absence of civil society organizations from the bodies 
which produce private-regulation111 are the most prominent factors to 
explain cohesiveness.112 In general, industrial and institutional factors can 
at least partially explain the failure to produce a cohesive framework for 
ESG reporting. The reporting frameworks generally encompass firms from 
different sectors, crucially undermining the “industrial factor”. Moreover, 
civil society organizations have participated, although with different 
degree of involvement, to the elaboration and administration of the 
 
 
106  See IRRC Institute, State of Sustainability and Integrated Reporting at 312018, 
https://www.weinberg.udel.edu/IIRCiResearchDocuments/2018/11/2018-SP-500-Integrated-
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107  See Sarah Dadush, Impact Investment Indicators: A Critical Assessment, in GOVERNANCE 
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The failure to produce a cohesive framework centered on business 
interests has become all the more relevant when ESG reporting and 
investing has been explicitly linked to business value and has become a 
major theme between the most prominent international investors.113 While 
CSR and SRI are inextricably linked to some non-financial performance 
standard, risk-return ESG investing – as it is framed by stock exchanges – 
is relevant to investors notwithstanding their moral commitments.114 
Furthermore, the blaming of short-termism as one of the causes of risky 
business practices115 has contributed to foster the demand for ESG in the 
context of a long-term investment horizon. The link between short-
termism, the necessity of changing business practices in order to avoid 
new regulation, and ESG factors has been explicitly made, in the context 
of the World Economic Forum, by one of the most prominent corporate 
lawyer in the world, Martin Lipton, in his proposal for a new paradigm in 
the relationship between investors and corporations.116 The author 
expressly states that the paradigm is meant to forge a private-sector 
solution “that may preempt a new wave of legislation and regulation such 
as adumbrated in the recent policy statement by Prime Minister Theresa 
May in the U.K.”117 and encourages corporations to incorporate ESG 
considerations in the development of their long-term strategies and 
operations, while investors are encouraged to address ESG issues.118 
Such a call for a harmonized framework centered on business interests, 
as well as the possibility of a regulatory backlash, have caused and are 
intertwined with the development of the SSEI and WFE reporting 
framework, which is mainly elaborated, addressed and implemented by 
stock exchanges around the world. The guidance and the key performance 
indicators reorder the dispersed frameworks for ESG reporting building a 
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paradigm centered on business value and establish exchanges as privileged 
fora for the regulation. The SSEI-WFE disclosure framework discussed 
below has significantly contributed to the enhancement of ESG disclosure 
around the world registered by the KPMG 2017 report.  
In the last years, the focus and aim of global ESG factors reporting 
have changed, led by a mix of new regulation, stock exchanges 
requirements and investors’ pressure.119 This wave of reporting requests is 
global. As at the end of 2017, four out of five of the countries where 
corporations provide more information about sustainability issues were 
emerging markets: India in the first place, followed by Malaysia, the UK, 
South Africa, and Taiwan.120 Furthermore, Latin America corporations’ 
rate of reporting between the largest companies improved by 7% from 
2015 to 2017,  compared to a 4% improvement in North America.121 
Although these data show that ESG reporting has become mainstream122 
and is nowadays considered the new normal, they say nothing about what 
is reported and the content of reports. Whilst the rate of reporting is 
welcomed cheerfully as showing a new engagement by corporations with 
global issues and, in particular, with climate change, the rate of reporting 
risks being meaningless without an analysis of what is reported, which is 
the substantial performance of the reporting entity and the possibility to 
compare the corporation against other corporation and historically against 
previous years’ performances.  
The KPMG report quoted above contends that the new reporting wave 
is due partially to new regulations enacted both at the national and 
supranational (EU) level and partially to stock exchange requirements, 
demonstrating the importance either of formal regulation or “self-
regulation” that are developed at the level of business fora.123 Whilst 
 
 
119  See Sarfaty, supra note 97, at 612.  
120  KPMG, supra note 92, at 22. 
121  Id. at 13. 
122  See David L. Levy & André Spicer, Contested Imaginaries and the Cultural Political 
Economy of Climate Change, 20 ORG. 659, 666 (2013) (explaining that the mainstreaming of ESG 
reporting and attention paid to environmental issues in the investment process seems to be inspired by 
a techno-market imaginary. “The techno-market imaginary is located between these poles; it assumes 
that the environment is somewhat vulnerable, but that the climate issue is manageable through 
appropriate economic incentives and technological innovation, without fundamentally compromising 
lifestyles or economic growth. This imaginary’s positioning highlights its hegemonic appeal, by 
claiming to reconcile economic and environmental concerns. Indeed, an increasingly common framing 
of this imaginary is that low carbon technologies should be pursued for reasons of profit and 
environmental side benefits, such as clean air, even if the climate is not at risk.”). 
123  KPMG, supra note 91, at 16. 











corporate social responsibility was considered a non-financial and not 
addressed mainly to investors, things have changed124 and the “non-
financial is the new financial.”125  
From the previous discussion we discern a pattern about ESG reporting 
in the last decade: on the one side, more and more corporations report, 
because of investors’ demand and because new business opportunities 
have been opened in fields linked to sustainability. On the other side, the 
mainstreaming of ESG considerations made necessary the implementation 
of more cohesive frameworks centered on financial consequences of ESG 
factors. The framework analyzed below is part of this mutated context: 
despite the widespread use of the word “sustainable”, the core purpose of 
the report is to provide information about emerging risks and strategic 
investment opportunities. It is also important to underline that the factors 
that are picked to be disclosed, and the way they are disclosed are crucial 
not only because of the indicators per se, but also because they are 
amplified by sustainability rating, and the associated indexes, provided by 
third parties.  
The analysis of how ESG metrics are produced and of their content is 
important because there is a general tendency to see the reallocation of 
capital to sustainable business activities as the panacea for the vast array of 
problems highlighted in the introduction.126 However, the concept of 
sustainability – as it emerges from ESG issues disclosure frameworks – 
does not correspond to the popular conception of sustainability. The 
concept of sustainability embodied in the ESG factors metrics is strictly 
linked to financial relevant factors. Whereas the reallocation of capital 
according to these parameters could for sure improve environmental or 
social performance, this does not correspond to the wide-ranging 
transformations that are needed from a macroeconomic point of view.  
It should be remarked that this risk conception of ESG factors reporting 
creates some ambiguities, partially due to the conflation of completely 
different issues under the same label. Moreover, ESG factors intended as 
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business risks entail issues related to litigation risk, potential new 
regulation risk, and reputational risk. While climate change surely plays 
the lion role in global investors’ concerns, the physical fact of climate 
change is not what can be dealt with by simple disclosure. Apart from the 
uncertainty linked to climate change and its consequences, climate change 
related damages will affect corporations unevenly, notwithstanding their 
specific attitude towards sustainability. In fact, climate change is a global 
issue and the sustainable business conduct of one specific corporation does 
not shield the very same corporation from the physical risk for operating 
in specific locations or from financial damages that global warming will 
cause at the macroeconomic level in the future.127 Quite to the contrary, in 
the short-term it is new regulation risk, as well as potential litigation, that 
directly affects the value of single securities.128 Indeed, specific 
regulations that target GHG emitters will have a predictable financial 
impact on certain corporations. As an example, future regulation that 
makes economically not viable fossil fuel projects or specific business 
activities could impose severe losses on investors.  Through these 
channels, climate change risk unevenly affects different corporations, 
whatever their stance about sustainability. 
Another problem is that sustainable issues to be disclosed are a moving 
target:129 apart from being potential (as every risk), these risks largely 
depends on future regulators’ actions, political perspectives and campaigns 
targeted at specific corporations. Many of the ESG factors are not relevant 
because of their physical representation of reality. Their significance rather 
lies in the social domain, at the intersection between business activity, 
political and regulatory choices, activists’ campaigns, and marketing 
strategies. Strictly linked to this issue lie an endogenous contradiction of 
 
 
127  In particular with regard to environmental matters, it has been assessed that so-called 
common owners could push for more sustainable business models because they are concerned with 
portfolio level, rather than firm level firm performance. In fact, because of the economic damages of 
climate change and because they are exposed to the wider economy performance, common owners 
have an interest in combating climate change. Nevertheless, it is highlighted that common owners 
incentives to tackle climate change are not aligned with the GHGs reduction level that is socially 
optimal. Madison Condon, Externalities and the Common Owner, 2019, on file with the Author. 
128  Brett Christophers, Environmental Beta or How Institutional Investors Think about Climate 
Change and Fossil Fuel Risk, 109 ANNALS AM. ASS. GEOGRAPHERS 763 (2019) (reporting 
interviewees – asset managers investing in fossil fuel companies – saying that “the regulatory risks are 
much more material to us than the physical risks” and “[f]or now, at any rate, it is not climate change 
itself that matters to company value, but the response to climate change in term of political action. Of 
course the risk will eventually be a mix of the two (physical and political). But not yet.”) 
129  Jill E. Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, Georgetown LJ 34 (forthcoming 
2019). 











voluntary ESG reporting that is highlighted by the framework explored 
below: the information disclosed by corporations are used also by third 
parties to provide sustainability and reputation indexes.130 Therefore, the 
disclosure of information could sometimes self-create the risk for a 
specific corporation.  
Whilst these global developments concerning ESG factors financial 
relevance made the creation of the framework possible, understanding its 
political-economy and its specific structure requires conceptualizing it 
through the insights about global governance and indicators. In fact, the 
structure and emergence of ESG factors disclosure frameworks cannot be 
explained as a simple response from businesses to investors’ demands. 
The next paragraph is dedicated to the elaboration of that conceptual 
framework in order to understand and assess the new regulatory 
framework presented afterwards. 
III. INDICATORS AND INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
A. Indicators as Technologies of Global Governance 
The last decades have seen an increase in the efforts to reduce complex 
social phenomena to pure numbers131 in order to rank, allocate resources 
and technically assess reality and its transformation. Indicators have been 
one of the technologies of global governance132 that have been at the 
center of this numerical turn. Indicators have been conceptualized in the 
following way: 
“An indicator is a named collection of rank-ordered data that 
purports to represent the past or projected performance of different 
units. The data are generated through a process that simplifies raw 
data about a complex social phenomenon. The data, in this 
simplified and processed form, are capable of being used to 
compare particular units of analysis (such as countries or 
institutions or corporations), synchronically or over time, and to 
evaluate their performance by reference to one or more 
standards.”133  
Despite most of the indicators have the form of rough numbers, they 
 
 
130  Power, supra note 58, at 140. 
131  Sarfaty, supra note 97, at 103. 
132  Peter Miller & Nikolas Rose, GOVERNING THE PRESENT (2008). 













can also be expressed in a more qualitative form,134 even if they are meant 
to allow comparison and present elements of ranking to allow assessment 
of the improvement of one measured subject and comparison across 
different subjects.135  
The ESG reporting framework and the key performance indicators that 
will be analyzed below present several characteristics of indicators136 and 
have both knowledge and governance effects.137 The general reporting 
framework specifies in a qualitative way which should be the purpose for 
the reports, who are the addressees of the report and the reasons to report. 
The key performance indicators measure performance on specified 
parameters concerning environmental, social and governance issues.  
The knowledge produced in technical terms has the effect to define 
what is sustainable and the meaning of sustainability itself, having 
therefore performative effects. This construction of the sustainable 
corporation is all the more relevant when we consider that the 
sustainability label has a marketing purpose that transcends the addressees 
of the report (investors), that the reports are specifically built to allow 
investors to assess the financial consequences of ESG factors, and that 
sustainable investing is seen as a way to solve broad macroeconomic and 
social issues, rather than solely as a way to improve financial performance. 
The technicalities of the numbers coupled with the specific label138 of the 
indicators have the effect to side-step the political dimension and to hide 
the ideology139 that lies at the root of the indicator itself: even the case 
studied below is no different.    
With regard to governance, indicators are used to make decisions by 
 
 
134  Davis, Kingsbury & Engle Merry, supra note 17, at 7. 
135  Id. at 8 
136  The GRI sustainability reporting framework, that shares several elements with the 
framework discussed in this paper, has been qualified as an indicator according to the provided 
definition. See Sarfaty, supra note 81, at 103 (providing definition). 
137  Sally Engle Merry, Measuring the World: Indicators, Human Rights, and Global 
Governance, 52 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY (SPECIAL ISSUE) 83, 84 (2011). 
138  Sally Engle Merry, supra note 138, at 84 (underlining the importance of labelling for the 
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indicator and content of the indicator itself.). 
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policy.” Kevin E. Davis, Benedict Kingsbury & Sally Engle Merry, Indicators as a Technology of 
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several actors.140 Moreover, the conception of indicators as a technology 
of governance involves that the target of the measurement can be 
conceptualized as the governed and the supplier of the indicator as the 
governor. The governance effect consists in the fact that the target of 
measurement is pushed to improve its performance along the specific 
indicators.141 Nevertheless, the direction of power relations is not always 
straightforward, depending on the interactions between the producers, the 
targets and the users of the indicator.142  
Finally, indicators can also be an instrument to retain political power, 
to align different actors that have coordination problems, to occupy 
regulatory space and to maintain hegemony. In the specific context of 
sustainability, the metrics involve a specific ideology of what 
sustainability means and how the conflicting interests of the different 
actors (civil society, labor, corporations, and investors) should be aligned. 
The power to establish the reporting framework has the effect to claim 
legitimacy and crystallize a specific concept of sustainability as adequate. 
Therefore, the production of regulation through indicators can be an 
instrument to assert legitimacy – through the claim of advancing general 
social welfare – and prevent extensive public regulation over issues that 
involve class conflict, distributional issues and the exploitation of common 
goods. 
B. Actors and Roles in the Production of Indicators 
In order to overcome the theoretical shortcomings of supply and 
demand models of the production of transnational regulation – 
specifically, the obfuscation of the political nature of indicators and the 
political process of their supply143 – Büthe proposed to distinguish four 
groups of stakeholders144 involved in the conceptualization, production, 
and use of an indicator: rule-demanders, rule-makers, targets and users of 
the indicator.145 This conceptual model allows us to understand better the 
incentives of the different actors involved in the trajectory of indicators 
development146 and, specifically, the political nature of this process, 
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142  Id. at 13. 
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departing from the supply and demand equilibrium model. Furthermore, 
Büthe affirms that the magnitude of the effects that indicators have on 
third parties that are excluded from the rule-making process highlight the 
divergence of this regulation model from formal democracy, where all of 
the affected parties have a voice in the decision-making process.147 
In the context of ESG factors disclosure, rule-demanders are mainly 
global investors and the public institutions that sponsored the framework, 
contrary to what happened with regard CSR where responsible practices 
were somewhat demanded by, and addressed to, advocacy groups. Rule 
makers are the subjects who elaborate the indicator and describe both the 
specific metrics to be disclosed and the principles that should guide the 
disclosure process. With regard to the framework disclosed below, the rule 
makers are a composited array of public and private organizations: the 
purpose and modalities that should guide the reporting process, in fact, are 
defined by the actors participating in the SSEI, whilst the specific key 
performance indicators are defined by the WFE and implemented, with 
potential variables, by national stock exchanges. Listed corporations are 
the target of the indicators that are evaluated. However, when the target 
can decide which factors to disclose, and can threat the final rule makers 
(in this case, stock exchanges) to exit a specific market, the position of the 
target of the indicator is more blurred. Finally, the users of the indicators 
are global investors that should include ESG factors in their investment 
decisions and sanction companies that perform poorly. However, because 
of the ambivalent nature of ESG risk factors highlighted above even this 
category is somewhat blurred. In fact, when more complete and accurate 
disclosure puts pressure on the shares’ price, risking to cause a specific 
harm, investors could prefer incomplete or inaccurate disclosure. 
Whilst the analysis proposed by Büthe allows to understand which the 
core actors are involved in the life-cycle of the indicator, certain points 
that are specifically relevant to the indicator described in the paper require 
further clarification.  
Büthe assesses that the establishment of an indicator can create power 
relationships in “the Dahlian sense of allowing one actor to do something 
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the latter would not otherwise have done.”148 It is undoubtedly true that 
indicators could perform such a power function, but this is reductive: 
indicators can also serve as coordinating mechanisms, in order to establish 
or retain hegemony in the definition, delimitation, and construction of a 
specific field.149 While the Dahlian conception of power is useful to assess 
the internal relations of power that indicators establish amongst the actors 
involved, it fails to encompass the political use and function of the 
indicators vis à vis third parties, that is nevertheless at the root of the 
elaboration of the model itself.  
This four groups structure is generally further layered because the rule-
makers consist of an association or of a coordinating body, that operates 
according to its internal logic. This layered structure should be taken into 
account to fully assess the life cycle of the indicator. Finally, whilst these 
four macro-actors are fundamental in the trajectory of the indicator, it is 
necessary also to consider which are the other stakeholders who could 
have a different interest in the social reality that the indicator purports to 
evaluate.  
C. Transnational Financial Associations and Global Governance 
The exercise of transnational private authority, even in the corporate 
governance field, can encounter several coordination problems among 
actors participating in the regulatory process, also because the solutions 
adopted often entail distributive issues among participants.150 This could 
impact the political activity of certain actors with similar interests and 
prevent the adoption of regulation that is beneficial to a specific class of 
actors at the aggregate level. 
Several associations that exercise authority over their members deal 
with the same issue. Since the ESG factors reporting infrastructure 
analyzed below relies heavily on the role of stock exchanges, it is 
necessary to deal with the role of the administrators of the infrastructure of 
financial markets to fully understand their role. Exchanges are the main 
venue for corporations’ listing and represent the intersection between 
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issuers of securities151 and traders.152 Therefore, exchanges, because of 
their crucial position, provide both a fundamental infrastructure for 
information discovery, price formation and trading, and implement 
specific corporate governance standards.153 Despite the often converging 
interests of corporations and investors, specifically with regards to third-
party interests and the preservation of profitability, tensions can and often 
do arise between corporations and short-term investors or traders,154 
because the success of a trading strategy is only loosely related to 
corporate performance.155 Such a weak nexus, as well as the different 
time horizons of investors and corporations sometimes put exchanges in 
an uneasy position about the specific rules to adopt. This pattern is further 
complicated by the role as standards setters of exchanges and their nature 
of profit-making corporations, that creates scope for conflict of 
interests.156 
Therefore, exchanges play a crucial role in the regulation of global 
capitalism: they mediate between the potentially conflicting interests of 
 
 
151  Corporations can also list their securities onto alternative trading systems, which are 
generally regulated in a lighter way than traditional exchanges but provide less liquidity. Nevertheless, 
global corporations are generally listed on major exchanges. 
152  Generally, even it is not true for every specific country, trades in securities that are listed on 
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especially when large amounts are bought or sold by a single trader, these transactions are generally 
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unevenly different trading strategies. 
155  The relationship between factors that affect firm performance and a profitable trading 
opportunity is well described by Schanzenbach and Sitkoff: "[b]ut a factor’s relationship to firm 
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capital markets consistently misprice the factor in a predictable manner that can be exploited net of 
any trading and diversification costs. Nor does identifying such a relationship give rise to a profitable 
active shareholding opportunity unless it points to improved future returns net or present costs to the 
investor.” Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 72, at 51. 
156  Johannes Petry, Securities Exchanges: Subjects and Agents of Financialization, in 
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF FINANCIALIZATION 10 (Daniel Mertens, Phil Mader & Natasha van 
der Zwan eds., 2019). Petry underlines the conflict between the profit-making corporation’s nature of 
Stock Exchanges and their organizational role with regard to markets that involve stability issues. 
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Maureen O’Hara, From Markets to Venues: Securities Regulation in an Evolving World, 58 Stan. L 
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different actors, but at the same time develop private transnational norms 
that weaken the role of public regulation157 and aim to occupy the 
regulatory space, while being generally backed by state power that 
delegates to them the authority to establish rules.158 Exchanges have 
undergone a genetic mutation in the last 30 years, becoming market actors 
rather than simple market places and shaping capital markets dynamics, 
fostering financialization and increasing their power over market 
governance.159 Exchanges constitute critical venues to establish and 
enforce specific corporate governance rules, while at the same time they 
operate according to their logic and specific rationales and are not-neutral 
to the several actors involved in the regulatory process.160  
Although exchanges coordinate and regulate their members, in order to 
act at the global level, they need to be coordinated as well; the main arena 
for this coordination activity is the WFE, that represents the transnational 
trade association of exchanges.161 Despite being often undertheorized,162 
transnational financial associations exercise a crucial role in the 
elaboration and diffusion of regulation amongst their members and 
contracting with outside groups.163 Rather than from their specific 
resources, transnational financial associations derive their power from 
their ability to enroll their participants to exercise power towards other 
actors.164 Their ability to enroll their members thus constitutes a 
fundamental link for the exercise of power and the success of the 
initiatives of the members themselves.  
These considerations about the role of transnational financial 
associations entail that when analyzing the different actors of the Büthe 
model, we should also take into account the different layers internal to 
single actors (in the case below, specifically, rule makers), that operate 
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according to their logic and substantially affect the regulatory outcome. 
That layered structure is all the more relevant considering that 
transnational private regulation generally deals with contested fields165 
where granting regulatory authority distributes power in a way that is 
difficult to amend later. Moreover, even if the exercise of hegemony 
involves concessions to weaker groups,166 the possibility to decide the 
mode and the content of regulation allows defining the basic concepts 
underpinning regulatory activity and to embed a specific ideology in the 
mode of regulation in a way that forcefully shapes the subsequent debate. 
IV. THE SSEI: A NEW FRAMEWORD FOR ESG REPORTING 
The previous parts of the paper have highlighted that the CSR and SRI 
approaches to ESG factors disclosure created a fragmented regulatory 
landscape, where different frameworks were elaborated and used, and 
where moral considerations were mixed with financial, business and 
marketing ones. The mainstreaming of ESG factors and the focus on their 
financial relevance called for more harmonized frameworks – explicitly 
focused on business value: one of those was developed by the SSEI and 
the WFE.167 In order to conceptualize this framework and to understand its 
political economy, the theoretical model outlined before will be used. The 
following parts of the paper will describe and assess the emergence of this 
new disclosure framework and will trace more general considerations 
about the substance and meaning of the “sustainable” corporation as it 
emerges from ESG factors disclosure paradigms.  
A. The SSEI: Actors, Reasons, Purposes  
The conceptual and political roots of the SSEI date back to 2004, when 
the UN Global Compact held a meeting with certain stock exchanges to 
explore the possibility of collaborating on sustainability issues.168 The 
initiative was followed in 2008 by two meetings between UNCTAD, the 
PRI and members of the international financial community that ended in a 
call to stock exchanges to consider the inclusion of a provision about 
sustainability disclosure as a listing requirement.169 This preliminary work 
 
 
165  Levy, supra note 33, at 948. 
166  Id. at. 952 
167  See sections III and IV. 
168  SSEI, History, http://www.sseinitiative.org/about/history/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2019). 
169  Id. 











resulted in the launch of the sustainable stock exchanges initiative in 2009 
by Ban Ki-Moon, UN Secretary-General at the time. In its launch 
statement, the Secretary-General highlighted the challenges posed by 2008 
global economic crisis, the economic and social disruptions caused by 
climate change and the ensuing problems of food and water scarcity, as 
well as energy security, poverty and the spread of diseases and the 
necessity of the joint work of UN, private financial actors and stock 
exchanges to address these issues and create a more sustainable, stable and 
inclusive economic order.170 This call seems to entail a broader conception 
of sustainability than the risk-based or strategic one typical of ESG factors 
disclosure frameworks. Furthermore, whilst global investors are usually 
depicted as the demanders of ESG issues related information, the 
involvement of international public institutions was crucial to sow the 
seeds of the framework.  
Until 2012, the main work of the SSEI unfolded in Global Dialogues 
where the three founding members (UN Global Compact, UNCTAD, and 
PRI) were joined by representatives of the WFE, IOSCO, national 
exchanges, and institutional investors.171 At the third Global Dialogue, 
held in Rio de Janeiro in 2012,172 UNEP-FI became the fourth organizing 
partner, completing the governance and organizational structure that still 
characterizes the SSEI.173 Consequently, exchanges were not the main 
sponsors or demanders of the regulatory framework. Instead, investors’ 
demand, business leaders (specifically through the Global Compact) and 
the SSEI organizing partners (which encompass UN bodies as UNCTAD 
and UNEP) focused on exchanges as the best subjects for implementing 
the existing private transnational regulatory structure.  
According to the four players paradigm outlined above, the rule 
demanders, in this case, are the public and private organizations that tried 
to build consensus about the development of the reporting framework. 
This remark allows casting the category of rule demanders in a nuanced 
light.174 To recognize that the demanders of the rule were part of the 
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institutional enterprise to produce the framework and that those did not 
correspond to the targets nor the users of the disclosure framework allows 
to immediately realize that the demand for the rule was entangled from the 
beginning with a political project, a specific vision of ESG disclosure and 
the blurred concept of sustainability.175  
Despite the participation to the Global Dialogues of NGOs, it is clear 
from the published overview of the meetings that from the very beginning 
stock exchanges and listing authorities176 were considered the privileged 
fora to guide companies on ESG disclosure and eventually require 
mandatory ESG disclosure as a listing requirement. Investors, exchanges 
and regulators were identified as the key actors who should have come out 
with new solutions and options.177 Investors’ participation to the project 
insured that a business case for ESG disclosure was made.178 Because 
stock exchanges179 sit at a critical juncture between investors and 
companies, they are at the best place to facilitate ESG disclosure180 in the 
absence of a public framework. Nevertheless, from early on the specific 
mode of regulation focused on the necessity to enroll business actors and, 
therefore, risk based ESG took the central stage. 
The success of this narrow focus for the enrollment of exchanges is 
evident from the comparison of the 2010 and 2012 meetings overview. 
Still, at the 2010 Global Meeting, only a minority of stock exchanges 
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would consider altering the listing requirements to mandate ESG 
disclosure.181 After only two years, at the 2012 third Global Meeting, a 
majority of the stock exchanges recognized the necessity of a uniform 
global approach to ESG disclosure182 and the first five exchanges 
expressly committed to advancing ESG disclosure in their market.183 Such 
a swift change of attitude demonstrates the importance of market 
infrastructure organizations and transnational financial associations in 
building consensus and aligning members' preferences concerning a 
specific kind of regulation: the layered structure of the rule makers 
(transnational association and single exchanges) was fundamental to enroll 
the members of the association in the regulatory enterprise. 
The dominance of stock exchanges in the governance of the SSEI is 
also highlighted by the institutional structure of the body.184 The policy 
direction and general guidance of the initiative, as well as the alignment 
with UN objectives, are vested in the governing board, which is composed 
of four of the CEOs or Directors of the UNCTAD, UN Global Compact, 
PRI and UNEP-FI.185 The Governing Board appoints the Advisory 
Committee, which is composed of major stakeholders in the area and 
provides strategic advice, as well as the Ambassadors, who promote SSEI 
work.186 The SSE Partner Stock Exchanges, which are defined as the 
“SSE’s main stakeholder”187 have a double role to play: on the one side, 
they “play a crucial role in setting the strategic direction of the SSE 
initiative through the SSE Consultative Group”.188 The Consultative Group 
is composed of Partner Exchanges and other SSE stakeholders from 
capital market groups; it meets quarterly to discuss, share research or 
expertise and its members contribute to specific outputs.189 On the other 
end, the progress of member exchanges in fostering sustainability is 
monitored and reported in a publicly available fact-sheet. In order to join 
the initiative, the efforts of stock exchanges are limited to endorsing this 
statement publicly: “[w]e voluntarily commit, through dialogue with 
investors, companies, and regulators, to promoting long term sustainable 
investment and improved environmental, social and corporate governance 
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disclosure and performance among companies listed on our exchange”190 
and to submit their progress on the fact sheet. This governance structure 
promotes the role of exchanges and other capital markets stakeholders in 
providing technical guidance, policy direction, and advice, whilst the final 
decision power is vested in the Governing Board.  
At the SSEI level, there is an evident lack of enforcing mechanisms. 
Exchanges are mandated to show and report their progress, but even 
acknowledging for some potential peer pressure to advance,191 no 
mechanism assures that meaningful improvements are made. Besides, 
none of the bodies of the platform can take decisions that are binding for 
the other members. The complete voluntariness of the initiative caps the 
possibility of adopting ESG disclosure that would risk going against listed 
corporations or trading investors’ interests as represented by exchanges.  
B. The SSEI Model Guidance 
The work towards the preparation of model guidance on ESG 
disclosure accelerated when the WFE established a Sustainability Working 
Group in March 2014, “with a mandate to build consensus on the purpose, 
practicality, and materiality of Environmental, Social, and Governance 
(ESG) data.”192 The Sustainability Working Group was meant as a 
fundamental expression of the will of the WFE to advance “transparency 
and fairness in the capital markets”193 and provided input to the 
elaboration of the model guidance.194 Because many of the WFE and SSEI 
stock exchanges members overlap, the involvement of the WFE was a 
major turning point towards the issue of more comprehensive guidance. 
In the same month, Ceres195 “in collaboration with BlackRock and 
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other major institutional investors, today announce an initiative to engage 
global stock exchanges via the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) on 
a possible uniform reporting standard for sustainability reporting by all 
exchange members.”196 The proposed listing rules197 were 
comprehensive198 in approach and scope: in fact, a listing rule is more 
stringent than simple guidance on how to disclose. As predicted by Catà 
Backer,199 the wideness of the listing rule has generated pushback from 
businesses, and the SSEI model guidance is less ambitious and strictly 
focused on the business case for ESG disclosure. 
These developments were followed by the issuance of the SSEI model 
guidance on reporting ESG information to investors.200 The model 
identifies stock exchanges as sitting at a crucial juncture between 
investors, listed companies and regulators and assesses that the lack of 
clear guidance on how to disclose ESG “creates a challenge for investors 
seeking a comprehensive view of a company's material issues.”201 Because 
of the increasing relevance of ESG information to the investment 
process,202 the model guidance “lays out the business case for reporting on 
ESG data, as well as basic principles to guide the reporting process.”203 
The guidance constitutes henceforth a model for exchanges to establish 
their guidance, suitable to the specific and local market conditions. 
Despite the recurrent assessment that the model is not binding and is 
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meant not to be so, it indicates the pathway towards ESG disclosure. The 
guidance equates the terms “sustainability” and “ESG”204 and defines them 
as “encompassing the broad set of environmental, social and governance 
considerations that can impact a company’s ability to execute its business 
strategy and create value. While ESG factors are at a times called non-
financial or extra-financial, how a company manages them undoubtedly 
has financial consequences.”205 This definition is centered on their 
potential adverse effects on the value of the company and treats ESG 
factors management as a form of risk management. However, the whole 
report is pervaded also by the idea that ESG issues sometimes represent an 
opportunity, specifically with regard to human capital and brand 
marketization.206  
The reasons for reporting stick to a rather narrow business case for 
ESG and are identified as the investors’ interest in ESG factors, the 
necessity to stay ahead of regulatory development and the purpose of 
strengthening financial performance.207 On the one hand, the model 
guidance expressly concerns communication between the company and 
investors;208 on the other, the necessity to interact with other stakeholders 
is recognized in so far as they can have an impact on value creation.209 The 
narrow conception of ESG is all the more evident in Annex C to the model 
guidance, where the primary objectives for reporting are identified as 
access to capital, profitability and growth, compliance and risk 
management, corporate reputation and branding, information flow, 
enhanced investor relations and engagement.210 Whilst these primary 
objectives have sub-specifications, they connect ESG disclosure with 
business value; the connection with stakeholders' welfare is subsumed 
under the necessity to innovate, enhance competitiveness and foster 
corporate reputation.211 
The core of the model guidance consists of the principles guiding  the 
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report preparation: the board of directors should oversee the report 
preparation while selected personnel and senior management should 
provide the strategic input.212 The guidance suggests identifying the 
audience of the report as the company’s top investors, specifically the ones 
that could be more interested in the long-term risks faced by the company. 
In order to define which ESG information to report, corporations should 
understand which ones are material for investors and business value.213 As 
the guidance recognizes the critical audience for the report also determines 
which is the crucial information to disclose: what is material for 
shareholders may be different from what is significant to society.214 This 
potential contradiction – and the clear focus on shareholders of the report – 
demonstrate the novelty of ESG factors reporting and the difference from 
CSR or SRI: the concept of sustainable corporation, despite the common 
meaning of the word, corresponds to a corporations that is managed in so 
far as to exploit business opportunities or not to endure specific financial 
damages.  
The model guidance proceeds with a call to report along indicators, as 
the GRI ones, and to provide directly in the report a comparison with 
industry averages and historical data215, in order to preserve the ranking 
functions of indicators. A specific point of tension that elucidates the 
purposes of the guidance is the approach to poor news disclosure. Since 
information on regulatory infractions and penalties is publicly available 
and known by stakeholders, the omission of this information could lower 
the report credibility. On the contrary, it is suggested that shareholders 
generally understand that no company has a perfect record and therefore 
should not penalize a corporation too much.216 This approach to “bad 
news” and the use of indicators is telling for several reasons. First of all, it 
implicitly recognizes that the preparation of the report generally involves 
cherry-picking and selected omissions. Rather than stating the necessity of 
the completeness and truthfulness of the report, for the sake of investors 
themselves if the information disclosed is relevant for the pricing process, 
the model guidance makes a “bad parresia” case for telling the truth217, 
without being too much concerned with the general accuracy of the report 
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issues. As argued by Fleming, following Foucault,218 corporate truth 
telling “uttered within a wider set of semantic statements that are false 
have an important inoculation effect.219  
Whilst this suggestion to implement tactical truth-telling is apt to 
describe corporate self-depiction in CSR statements directed towards 
stakeholders, it sounds surprising when it is made in the context of a report 
addressed to investors, where information is meant to ameliorate the 
pricing process. Therefore, this conception of mistakes and deficiencies 
concerning problematic sustainability issues faced by the corporation 
reverberates the corporate-promotion function of ESG reporting rather 
than the idea that ESG information is crucial to the pricing process. 
However, this approach to cherry-picking is less surprising when we 
consider the role of ESG factors disclosure and the management of 
business risk. As it was highlighted above, sometimes the disclosure itself 
of specific information could create the risk, and even more so when the 
information is picked up by external indexes providers. Therefore, the 
approach to bad news sits at a critical juncture between marketing, 
important information for the pricing process and the contentious issue of 
the very same shareholders’ interest in accurate information. 
C. A Preliminary Approach 
Summing up, the model guidance provides more of a meta-structure for 
ESG reporting rather than the details of the report or the reporting process 
themselves. The approach is consistent with the fact that the SSEI did not 
move in a regulatory vacuum and that the model guidance should serve for 
individual exchanges to implement their tailored guidance. Nevertheless, it 
downplays more ambitious programs, as the 2014 Ceres listing 
requirements, and explicitly links the reporting process to a business case 
and shareholder-centric logic. The definition of the audience and the 
rationales for reporting substantially carve out a more inclusive report, 
reproducing and reinforcing the centrality of shareholders in corporate 
governance. Whilst it has been acknowledged that shareholder-centric 
corporate governance has slowed innovation, reduced productive 
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investment,220 raised inequality and enhanced short-termism,221 the idea of 
posing shareholders as the crucial sustainability enforcers seems quite 
illusory.222 For short term traders in securities, it is almost impossible to 
delineate a successful trading strategy based on ESG factors.223 With 
regard to longer-term investors interested in corporate performance and 
potential value creation in the future, studies about the above-average 
performance of corporations that perform better on ESG factors are 
inconclusive.224 How to explain the centrality that shareholders have been 
entrusted as sustainability gatekeepers? The central role of shareholders as 
gatekeepers for sustainability efforts seems due to the historical evolution 
of corporate reforms implemented around the world in the last thirty 
years225 outlined in the introduction of the paper. However, this role is at 
odds with the fact that shareholder value maximization – generally 
sponsored by shareholders – is one of the root causes of the very same 
problems that the former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon deemed in need 
of a solution through the adoption of the sustainability practices sponsored 
by the SSEI.226 
This conundrum, apart from historical and political reasons, can be also 
resolved when we unpack the concept of sustainability that lies at the root 
of ESG reporting. While sustainability is a word charged with a powerful 
symbolic meaning, and proponents of ESG factors disclosure highlight 
how sustainable corporations can tackle broader social macro-problems, 
the concept of sustainability that lies at the basis of the analyzed 
framework is rather narrow. In fact, ESG issues are considered either as 
risks or strategic opportunities.227 Therefore, corporations should focus on 
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the factors that are material to their specific business and not on all the 
factors considered. This approach has made it easier to enroll different 
business actors but departs from what the framework was declared to be 
necessary to achieve when it was launched. The very same concept of 
sustainability is rather different from the common meaning of the word. 
Performing well along ESG factors constitutes a way of navigating 
turbulent and uncertain times rather implementing the much-needed 
changes to what is recognized as an unsustainable socio-economic system. 
Nonetheless, the outlined issues about the possibility to foster 
meaningful, sustainable practices probably constitute the reasons why the 
reporting guidance could be successful – that is, being adopted and 
becoming widespread amongst exchanges, corporations and investors. The 
SSEI presents two institutional elements that are crucial for the success of 
private transnational regulatory schemes according to the Fransen and 
Conzelmann paradigm:228 loose standards from which the participants (in 
such a case, the exchanges) can opt out and the business dominance of the 
production and implementation of the regulatory framework. Of course, 
these elements foster enrollment of the market infrastructure managers, but 
also risk being the framework’s Achilles’ heel, creating an uneven playing 
field at the global level, mere greenwashing and low progress on the 
sustainability agenda, that would enhance the likelihood of public 
regulation. 
The history of the development of the guidance confirms some of the 
underlying themes of the analytical framework advanced before. The 
intervention of the transnational financial association was necessary in 
order to enroll exchanges in the program in the first place. Furthermore, 
rather than producing a single set of indicators the outcome of the model 
guidance consists in re-orienting the practice of ESG reporting towards a 
business rationale logic, making a business case for disclosure of ESG 
factors that are considered material for investors and corporations. This is 
coherent with the role of investors as the users of the ESG reports and the 
lax enforcing mechanisms towards corporations, the targets of the 
regulatory framework. 
This paradigm highlights the political nature of the development, 
demand, and issuance of the framework. It is, in fact, clear that the model 
guidance does not even come close to harmonizing ESG reporting 
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frameworks, but it re-directs them. In order to pursue this strategy, even 
the model guidance advisory group members229 are predominantly from 
the business community – stock exchanges, corporations and investors – 
and only a few ones come from civil society or NGOs.  
The model guidance can interact with already established reporting 
frameworks, as the GRI one: even in such a case, the SSEI guidance 
frames the way the report is prepared and the addressees of the disclosed 
information. However, the lack of an independent set of indicators risks 
undermining the ability of single stock exchanges to implement their list 
of metrics. Furthermore, as it has been argued above, voluntary reports 
such as GRI were the outcome of multi-stakeholder processes and did not 
forcefully limit to a business-case for ESG factors disclosure but are 
intermingled with CSR. It has been shown that the curtailing of the 
sustainability concept was necessary to mainstream ESG. Therefore, the 
establishment of an autonomous set of indicators could foster this 
disentanglement process from CSR and speed up the diffusion of ESG 
performance disclosure. This task has been taken up by the WFE. 
V. THE WFE INDICATORS 
A.  The Role and Functions of the WFE 
The WFE is the global association for exchanges and clearing 
houses.230 “Founded in 1961, the Federation was set up to contribute to the 
development, support, and promotion of organized and regulated securities 
markets in order to meet the needs of the world’s capital markets in the 
best interests of their users. This remains the WFE mandate today.”231 In 
order to qualify for the WFE, an exchange must meet and comply with 
stringent membership criteria.232 The WFE role consists of: representing 
the industry within the international financial community, providing 
information through the publication of statistics, harmonizing standards 
for the organization and conduct of the business, and supporting the 
expansion of the industry, also through capacity building activities and 
research sharing. 233   
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The WFE encompasses the vast majority of exchanges around the 
world, both in “developed” and “developing” countries. It is composed of 
250 market infrastructures providers, and 48,000 companies are listed on 
member exchanges. The aggregate capitalization of listed equity securities 
amounts to $ 82.5 trillion.234 The importance of being part of the 
association is best explained with the example of the London Stock 
Exchange. The London Stock Exchange left the WFE in 2013 because of 
divergent interests regarding dark pools and off-exchange activities235 but 
then applied for re-admission (completed in October 2018)236 in order to 
regain and wield more influence in the regulation-making process.237  
According to the McKeen Edwards and Porter’s definition, the WFE 
operates both in the social and in the regulatory sphere238 and is a 
transnational financial association.239 Despite the fact that the WFE is not 
principally engaged in the production of corporate governance standards to 
be adopted by member exchanges, it has been able to interact and intersect 
the development of the ESG reporting framework, helping to enroll global 
member exchanges and guaranteeing in this way the centrality of 
exchanges in administering the ESG disclosure framework.  
The turning point for the WFE with regard to sustainability issues was 
the establishment of the aforementioned Sustainability Working Group in 
March 2014, composed of representatives of member exchanges.240 Whilst 
the WFE and its Sustainability Working Group were not a direct part of 
the SSEI governance structure, they substantially participated in the 
elaboration of the model guidance in two direct ways. First, as the model 
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guidance itself recognizes, the WFE provided valuable inputs.241 Second, 
the exchanges that compose the WFE do, for the most part, mirror those of 
the SSEI Consultative Group.242 Furthermore, the WFE implemented the 
model guidance providing a list of indicators against which corporations 
should report, firstly published in 2015 and revised in 2018. Since the 
2018 list of metrics makes only incremental changes to those of 2015, the 
2015 indicators will be discussed first, followed by an analysis of the 2018 
metrics and how they were modified. This diachronic analysis is important 
because it allows to give a closer look to how the indicators evolve. 
B. The WFE’s Indicators 
1. The 2015 Indicators 
In 2015, member exchanges demanded the WFE’s Sustainability 
Working Group to identify the most material key performance indicators 
for ESG reporting.243 The workstream that brought to light the need to 
issue key performance indicators is highlighted at the beginning of the 
guidance:  
First and foremost, we worked closely with the United Nations 
Sustainable Stock Exchanges (SSE) initiative to create a substantive 
document: the Model Guidance (MG) on Reporting ESG 
Information to Investors. The MG was made public in September 
and provides a broad and business-centric rationale for better ESG 
reporting by the companies that list on global stock exchanges. The 
MG outlines the principles behind exchange involvement in this 
issue, but does not enumerate the specific data points (or Key 
Performance Indicators) that have the most impact.244  
The 2015 document (appendix 1) stresses that it should be read in 
conjunction with the SSE model guidance, that it is not WFE intention to 
dictate mandatory standards or requirements with regard to ESG 
disclosure and that the chosen key performance indicators are linked to the 
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value drivers for ESG reporting identified by the model guidance.245 The 
list of key performance indicators is not meant to be prescriptive: whilst it 
can be used “without any alteration,”246 exchanges are encouraged to 
customize the list to better fit the needs and specificities of their 
markets,247 taking into account the levels and format of reporting and its 
content, in particular, if there is not a clear link between ESG reporting 
and financial impact.248 Eventually, the “discursive” part of the guidance 
states that the WFE Sustainability Working Group can and will provide 
technical assistance to exchanges in drafting ESG disclosure guidance, 
specifically with regard to materiality issues249, and affirms that if no 
listing requirements or comply-or-explain model about ESG reporting is 
adopted, then participation in ESG reporting should be marketized to listed 
corporations through the identified value drivers.250 
The 33 key performance indicators encompass environmental, social 
and governance issues. In order to assess the effects of these indicators it 
is necessary to provide a taxonomy of their different structures. It is clear 
that when a specific, meaningful measure can be produced on a specific 
issue, the indicator is more useful for the pricing process and the 
investment decision. According to the previously provided definition, the 
possibility to deploy a ranking effect is constitutive of the nature of 
indicators themselves and essential to the knowledge and governance 
effects. Comparability and rankings nurture governance through numbers, 
and to be effective the selected parameters should conform to this ideal. 
Furthermore, if ESG issues are framed as business risks, indicators should 
provide meaningful information to be included in the pricing process. 
Whilst the complete table of the 2015 WFE guidance can be found in the 
appendix, we can identify three different typologies of indicators: rough 
numbers, ratios, and yes/no answers to the adoption of certain policies or 
codes. 
Environmental indicators tend to require the reporting company to 
publish and report a rough number concerning the total GHG emissions, 
the carbon intensity, the total energy consumption, and the energy 
intensity, the renewable energy intensity, waste and water management.251 
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Theoretically, these indicators can be useful in providing reliable numbers 
for the evaluation of the energy impact of the activities of a corporation 
and could provide investors with a measurable quantity to assess how a 
potential change in the regulatory structure could affect the operating costs 
of the company. Nevertheless, the mere reporting by corporations 
according to these indicators could not provide an accurate picture of the 
potential regulatory costs and almost all of these numbers should be put in 
context - assessed against output and the specific activities carried out – in 
order to be adequately understood.252 Moreover, since production is 
generally fragmented along global value chains, reporting numbers about 
the environmental impact of a single corporation risks being misleading.  
Clearly, from the point of view of brand advertisement, the reporting of 
these numbers could be useful for marketing purposes, in order to attract 
customers. In fact, a simple number that puts the corporation above the 
average about emissions can be easily and positively marketed, and the 
absence of more specifications could be an advantage rather than an 
obstacle. Moreover, apart from the pricing need of ESG reporting and the 
marketing function, reporting against specific metrics could help organize 
production by reducing operating costs and therefore outcompeting on 
environmental matters.  
The 2015 environmental standards are completed by filling out a 
yes/no indicator about environmental policy, and a request about liability 
for environmental impact. Both standards reveal the weaknesses of the 
yes/no indicator. On the one hand, following an environmental policy per 
se does not say anything about the policy itself, its scope and the way it is 
operationalized. Therefore, without the provision of more information, a 
positive answer is very well suited to fall prey to greenwashing, but not 
very meaningful for the pricing process. Potential liability for an 
environmental impact is significant for the pricing process and should be 
part of the risk management function of the corporation, but the answer 
should be much more detailed to be meaningful and valuable. For 
example, it would be necessary to ask such questions as what is an 
“environmental impact,” or what is the threshold to consider pollution or 
waste an impact? And once an “environmental impact” has been defined, 
which are the corporation’s activities that present a risk of producing an 
 
 
252  Just to give but one example, when corporations claim that they source 100% of their energy 
consumption from renewables, there could be misunderstandings regarding the exact scope of such a 
claim if it is not considered taking into account the grid structure and the necessity of uninterrupted 
electricity. Uma Outka, “100% Renewable”: Company Pledges and State Energy Law, forthcoming 














With regard to the social factors, most of the indicators are not rough 
numbers, but ratios. The decision about which rough numbers should be 
reported is not neutral, and this is even more true with regards to the ratio 
indicators. The decision to compare the two terms is dictated by the 
specific vision of the origin of problematic issues. Generally, the 
environmental impact of business activity is considered an externality, and 
the contentious issue concerns how much should be internalized by firms 
and which should be the equilibrium between economic activity and 
environmental preservation.253 On the contrary, social issues always 
involve distributional issues between capital and labor254 and often 
intersect with gender matters. Therefore, the definition of the two terms of 
the ratio is highly contentious.  
As it was highly predictable given the composition of the body issuing 
the standards, the chosen indicators avoid direct comparisons between 
employees pay, labor productivity and financial returns for shareholders, 
substantially preventing any direct comparison by capital and labor share 
in the results of production. The only meaningful comparison in this 
regard is the CEO pay ratio compared to the median salary. A similar rule 
has been implemented in the US by the Dodd-Frank Act and has become 
finally operative for the 2018 proxy seasons.255  Whilst the real effects of 
the rule are still unclear, it has been found that the result of the ratio 
mostly depends on the median employee salary rather than on CEO 
compensation.256 Thus the ratio largely depends on the employee base 
being taken into account.  
 
 
253  However, climate economists’ view on how to tackle the climate change challenge differ on 
many issues along different axis. See Servaas Storm, How the Invisible Hand is Supposed to Adjust the 
Natural Thermostat: A Guide for the Perplexed, 23 SCI. ENG. ETHICS 1307 (2017). 
254  The distribution of returns between capital and labor is one of the fundamental drivers of 
stock price increases. I.e., it has been argued that most of the increase in stock prices in the US starting 
from the end of the 80s has been due to a redistribution of rent from labor to shareholders, rather than 
because of economic growth. See Daniel L. Greenwald, Martin Lettau & Sydney C. Ludvigson, How 
the Wealth Was Won: Factor Shares as Market Fundamentals (NBER Working Paper 25769, 2019), 
available at https://www.nber.org/papers/w25769.pdf. 
255  Deb Lifshey, The CEO Pay Ratio: Data and Perspectives from the 2018 Proxy Season (Oct. 
14, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/10/14/the-ceo-pay-ratio-data-and-perspectives-from-
the-2018-proxy-season/. The technical difficulties in calculating the ratio and its meaningfulness have 
been reported by Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, US Companies Reveal Pay Gap Between Bosses and 
Workers (Financial Times, Apr 16, 2019, available at https://www.ft.com/content/1ee790f0-5da8-
11e9-b285-3acd5d43599e) (reporting the technical difficulties in calculating the ratio and its 
meaningfulness). 
256  Id. 











Although similar considerations can be extended to the gender median 
salary ratio, this information risks to lose value if it is not coupled with 
more detailed information, specifically the gender diversity ratio. This 
would require the corporation to specify the rate of women occupying 
different corporate positions and could be more valuable in assessing the 
different distribution of powers in the organization. Even if the financial 
relevance of these parameters is not clear-cut, they could serve as 
marketing instruments and diversity is generally regarded as positive for 
the performance of firms. Finally, the temporary worker and employees 
turnover rate metric is useful to manage so-called human capital and the 
organization of production. 
The rough number indicators required under the social label are the 
injury rate and the number of human rights violations filed, addressed, or 
resolved. Even in this case the number could be very different according to 
the business dimension that is considered: the individual company or the 
companies that are part of the value chain and the production network. 
Furthermore, the single number without any further context prevents the 
comprehension of the seriousness and typology of injuries and human 
rights violations.257  
The social factors end with two yes/no indicators about the adoption of 
a policy about global occupational and health, the adoption of a human 
rights policy or statement258 and about the prohibition of child and forced 
labor about the supply chain.259 Both answers, if not coupled with more 
data, operationalizing methodologies, and supervision mechanisms are 
meaningless for the pricing function of ESG information and can easily be 
used to exhibit a fake sustainability approach that is not duly implemented. 
Finally, the governance issues have the merit to be broader than what is 
generally termed as corporate governance,260 in so far as they also 
encompass the adoption of an ethics code, a fair labor code and of a 
 
 
257  The same problem with quantitative reporting of human rights issues under the GRI 
framework is highlighted by Sarfaty, who deems that the application of risk management practices to 
human rights issues can emphasize their regulatory dimension, but disregards their sovereignty 
dimension. Sarfaty, supra note 96, at 613.  
258  Anyway, it is not apparent which is the financial impact of human rights violations and 
investing in activities at risk can nonetheless be extremely remunerative; furthermore, the adoption of 
a human rights code can become a substitute for human rights respect and a meaningful 
implementation policy. Banerjee, supra note 63,  88. 
259  See appendix A. 
260  However, the exact domain of corporate law and governance is contentious. Christopher M. 
Bruner, What is the Domain of Corporate Law? (University of Georgia School of Law, Paper No. 
2019-04) (arguing about the historically contingent nature of the domain of corporate law, contrary to 













supplier code of conduct. The main problem with these broad governance 
standards is that a simple yes or no answer is quite meaningless, without 
providing more detailed guidance on the individual issues. Furthermore, 
the straight answer risks to be misleading, in so far formal compliances 
also presume to be substantial compliance, although no information about 
the substance is provided.261  
Before providing a general assessment of the WFE level of regulation, 
it is necessary to assess how these guidelines were amended in June 2018. 
Why and how certain amendments are made helps to better understand the 
power dynamics amongst the four actors involved in the elaboration of the 
indicators. 
2. The 2018 Indicators 
After the publication of the key performance indicators in 2015, over 
35 stock exchanges have issued or committed to issuing ESG reporting 
guidance,262 the UN Sustainable Development Goals263 have been 
approved, and the Task Force on Climate Related Financial Disclosure264 
has issued its recommendations. In order to take into account these 
developments, as well as the feedback received on the implementation 
experience, the WFE issued a revised version of its metrics in June 
2018.265 Even if the guidance affirms that it is not meant to be prescriptive, 
but that it instead provides a summary of emergent best practices and 
should be used by exchanges as a baseline for their ESG disclosure 
policy,266 it reinforces certain points underlying the 2015 version. 
The revised document (appendix 2) is composed of a descriptive part 
and an updated version of the key performance indicators. With regard to 
the purpose and organization of the ESG reporting process, the 2015 
guidance substantially remanded to the SSEI model guidance. Although 
the paradigm for the 2018 revised metrics maintains the SSEI model 
guidance, it stresses that financially relevant ESG factors should be the 
focus of the report. The revised guidance confirms that investors are the 
 
 
261  Sarfaty, supra note 82, at 117-19. 
262  WFE, supra note 13, at 2.  
263  UN Sustainable Development Goals, About, available at 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300. 
264  Task Force on Climate Related Financial Disclosure, About, available at https://www.fsb-
tcfd.org/about/. 
265  WFE, supra note 13, at 2. 
266  Id. at 3. 











target audience for ESG disclosure. Information should, therefore, 
encompass investor-relevant and decision-useful information,267 specify 
how these issues translate into value creation or destruction, and detail 
how the ESG factors impact products, the value chain, R&D investments, 
and operations.268 The report further states the necessity of board-level 
oversight of the report preparation and provides a menu of definitions of 
materiality for exchanges.  
In general, the key performance indicators retain the same structure as 
the 2015 indicators: they are divided into the environmental, social and 
governance categories and can be qualified as rough numbers, ratios and 
yes/no indicators, with the strengths and weaknesses mentioned 
previously. 
Apart from the rebranding of specific metrics, several amendments 
have been implemented. A response or explain rationale is suggested to 
guide the method of reporting.269  Such a change is positive in so far it 
could limit cherry picking and selective disclosure that does not provide a 
comprehensive image of ESG practice. Even if the 2015 guidance 
connected the performance indicators to other reporting standards,270 the 
updated version remands to specific standards (even public regulatory 
ones) to define more clearly what should be reported and what should be 
considered when producing the metric. Although that is particularly 
relevant for what has been termed as rough number or ratio indicators, it is 
also relevant for yes/no indicators, in so far it specifies that when a 
specific code or policy is adopted, public content should be cited if 
available. 
Finally, certain metrics that were not reported by corporations were 
eliminated, namely the tax transparency and the human rights indicators.271 
Whilst this process is consistent with the voluntary and non-binding nature 
of the ESG disclosure framework elaborated at the WFE level, it 
highlights the shortcomings of the system, specifically the flaws of having 
to enroll the reporting corporations and the ambiguous distribution of 
power from the regulator (rule makers) and the regulated entities (target of 
the rules). Furthermore, this initiative to remove the indicators that are not 
 
 
267  Id. at 2. 
268  Id. at 4. 
269  WFE 2018 ESG Revised Metrics, see appendix B. 
270  Specifically, the 2015 indicators identified whether reporting or consideration of the same 
issue was requested by the GRI G4, CDP, SASB, IIRC, and UNGC sustainability frameworks. 













reported or only partially reported272 fits with the new respond or explain 
approach to ESG disclosure and the idea that the request of information 
has a regulatory effect that can bring to a more sustainable economic path. 
Quite to the contrary, the elimination of sustainability standards that are 
not reported demonstrates the weakness of the system. 
The standards that have been eliminated had controversial content that 
could foster public accountability not only limited to investors. Their 
exclusion from the revised set of indicators aptly demonstrates two points 
that have been raised before. First, the concept of sustainability issues 
disclosure is linked to potential business risks or strategic areas. Factors 
that do not represent opportunities or exposes companies only to limited 
risks compared to the gains of “unsustainable” practices should be 
excluded. Strictly linked to this is the second remark. Disclosure of certain 
factors could create ex se the risk, specifically when these issues are 
included in sustainability indexes provided by third parties. In this case, 
exclusion of a factor from the list is a way better solution than non-
disclosure by single corporations. 
While the enrollment of single exchanges through the SSEI 
international framework and the WFE succeeded in involving exchanges, 
the voluntariness of participation and the lack of enforcing mechanisms 
showed how the necessity to continually gain consensus of both the rule 
makers (national stock exchanges) and the target of the rules 
(corporations) hampers the possibility to push further the disclosure 
indicators and casts a more nuanced light about the power relations 
between the producer of the indicators and the target of regulation. 
Moreover, it demonstrates the conflicted roles that global investors have as 
users of the indicators. 
As has been already described, the success of the SSEI-WFE disclosure 
framework of ESG factors depends on the provision of listing rules or 
disclosure guidance by single exchanges. The first step requires therefore 
solely the enrollment of exchanges who are then left free to design their 
specific standards. When only disclosure guidance is implemented,273 the 
success of the framework crucially depends on voluntary reporting by 
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273  In fact, listing rules are generally binding and therefore listed corporations do not have great 
scope for non-compliance. Nevertheless, even listing rules allow for more nuanced arrangements when 
a comply or explain approach is adopted. 











corporations.274 The backlash for such non-reporting could be divestment, 
investors’ demand for more stringent disclosure provisions and exchanges’ 
implementing a more pervasive listing rule. The threatening force of this 
potential backlash is nevertheless diminished by the fact that the aggregate 
reporting habits of listed corporations matters, rather than individual 
corporations’ behavior, and it is difficult to draw a straightforward link 
with regulatory responses. 
The WFE decision to tackle this noncompliance issue through the 
amendment of the key performance indicators according to the reporting 
practices275 inverts the power relationships among the indicator supplier 
and the target of measurement. The decision to account for target 
preferences in the issuance of regulation itself surely increases the level of 
formal compliance, but reduces the scope of regulation and undermines 
the regulatory binding force, starting a sort of regulatory conversation 
amongst the issuers of indicators and targets, which is internal to the actors 
of the regulatory paradigm.276 What remains unaltered is instead the power 
effects towards external actors and the claim to the regulatory space, that 
continues to be occupied by the reporting framework.277 
C. Stock Exchanges’ Implementation 
The revised version of the standards has just been implemented, and it 
is still early to ascertain whether exchanges at a global level are scaling up 
their efforts in a meaningful way to spread sustainability disclosure. 
Nevertheless, some results do show that the framework has catalyzed 
exchanges activities to become one of the main actors in the ESG factors 
disclosure scenario. The last WFE sustainability survey reports that 
exchanges, even more than regulators, are the most active subjects that 
encourage or require ESG disclosure and guide listed issuers on the 
topic278 and that a broad consensus about exchanges’ participation in the 




274  The same WFE acknowledges that in the absence of a listing rule or comply or explain 
voluntary framework participation should be marketized to corporations according to the identified 
business value drivers.  
275  WFE, supra note 13, at 2. 
276  On the actors involved in the production of indicators and their roles see section II.B. 
277  On the power relationships involved in the production of indicators see section II.A. 
278  WFE, Exchanges Maturing in Their Sustainability Efforts 9 (2018), https://www.world-
exchanges.org/storage/app/media/research/Studies_Reports/wfe-annual-sustainability-survey-updated-
june-2018.pdf. 













Even the SSEI, that continues to monitor exchanges involvement and 
progress about sustainability issues, has found that “[c]ontinued growth in 
stock exchange engagement with sustainability activities indicates a 
market demand for more information on sustainability and a growing 
understanding of the materiality of ESG issues to corporate financial 
performance.”280  
As the graphs below demonstrate, the last years have seen a steep 
increase in exchanges providing guidance on how to report or requiring 
ESG disclosure as a listing rule, and the SSEI report connects this increase 
to the guidance provided by the SSEI and the WFE in 2015.281 
 
 
Source: SSEI 2018 Report on Progress, 16. 
 
 
280  SSEI, SSEI 2018 Report on Progress 7 (2018), available at https://sseinitiative.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/SSE_On_Progress_Report_FINAL.pdf. This partially contradicts what has 
been found by the WFE's survey, where lack of investors demand is considered one of the main 
concerns of exchanges with sustainability. WFE, supra note 278, at 3.  
281  SSEI, supra note 281, at 16. 












Source: SSEI 2018 Report on Progress, 17. 
This progress, therefore, shows that, at least at a formal level, the 
regulatory framework has been successful and exchanges enrollment has 
happened along the desired lines of the institutional entrepreneurs that set 
the whole process in motion. Exchanges are becoming prominent actors of 
ESG disclosure regulation worldwide. The engagement with sustainability 
by stock exchanges should continue in the next years: on the 4th of October 
2018, the WFE has published a set of five sustainability principles282 and 
its members have committed to foster a more sustainable financial 
system.283 
Nevertheless, this does not clarify the content of reporting and exactly 
the way in which the listing rules and the report guidance are drafted by 
single exchanges. This analysis should be conducted at the level of single 
exchanges considering the specific cases and the already existing 
regulations in different countries and is beyond the scope of this paper, 




282 WFE, WFE Sustainability principles (Oct 4, 2018), available at https://www.world-
exchanges.org/our-work/articles/wfe-sustainability-principles. 
283 Specifically, the second principle requires that “[e]xchanges will promote the enhanced 
availability of investor-relevant, decision-useful ESG information.” WFE, WFE Sustainability 















VI. THE POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF THE SSEI-WFE FRAMEWORK 
The previous discussion put the SSEI-WFE indicators in their political-
economy context, which accounts for the power relations that the 
indicators create amongst the several actors. In order to do so, the paper 
discussed what is the meaning of sustainability at the center of ESG 
factors disclosure and the analysis provided accounts for the multi-layered 
structure of the rule-issuers in order to assess how the internal functioning 
logic of transnational financial associations has made the implementation 
of the reporting framework possible and how it has shaped it. Different 
questions follow from the institutional and political-economy rationales of 
the indicators: can the indicators be effective in providing meaningful and 
comprehensive information about ESG factors? Can the indicators 
significantly reallocate capital towards more sustainable corporations? 
What role do external actors, who are not participating in the elaboration 
of the indicator and who conceive sustainability in a different and broader 
way, have to contest or to exploit ESG factors disclosure?  
A. Harmonization of Information Disclosure 
One of the stated purposes for the project was the production of a 
harmonized reporting framework to allow corporations to satisfy 
investors’ demands for ESG information.284 Although success or failure in 
this regard should be measured empirically after an adequate period of 
time, several conclusions can be drawn about the likelihood of success of 
such an institutional framework in providing a meaningful and comparable 
set of information. The following discussion is relevant also to current 
controversies and calls for regulators – notably in the United States – to 
issue guidance on ESG disclosure285 or provide formal and detailed 
rules.286 The contradictions and the problems outlined below indicate that 
model guidance issued by an administrative body would not address the 
structural problems of voluntary reporting and elucidate why a mandatory 
framework would encounter fierce opposition.  
In general, ESG reporting frameworks encounter several technical 
 
 
284 Of course, the claims about investors’ demands for ESG factors disclosure, as well as those 
by corporations about their responsible behavior, should be taken cum grano salis, because of the - 
sometimes striking – divergence between public speeches and claims and real practice or voting 
patterns. See Pilita Clark, Time’s up for a Golden Age of Corporate Greenwashing (Financial Times, 
May 19, 2019), available at https://www.ft.com/content/407260f2-787d-11e9-bbad-7c18c0ea0201. 
285 Harper Ho, supra note 6, at 37-42; Jill E. Fisch, supra note 129. 
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issues in providing meaningful information: as found by Boiral and Henri 
about the GRI indicators, the chief technical issues for comparability are 
the qualitative nature of many indicators, the different scales of 
measurements adopted by quantitative metrics, the diversity of contexts 
where information is collected and the lack of disclosure about many 
metrics.287 As highlighted by the Authors, these issues do not depend only 
on functionalist and technical considerations, but also on the power 
structure of the reporting process.288  
These same issues apply to the SSEI-WFE reporting framework and 
undermine the probability of producing meaningful and comparable 
information for investors. The analyzed metrics have been labeled as 
rough numbers, ratios and yes/no answers, and they present the very same 
issues as the GRI metrics – both the quantitative and the qualitative ones. 
Finally, the technical issue about cherry-picking among the standards 
largely depend on the specific frameworks implemented by single 
exchanges. Nevertheless, the respond or explain approach adopted by the 
2018 metrics could partially solve the issue, even if its effectiveness 
largely depends on the specificity and accuracy of the explanations 
provided by corporations for non-reporting.289  
The second institutional obstacle to providing meaningful and 
comparable data is the potential contradiction of ESG factors as crucial 
information for the pricing process and as a potential business and 
marketing opportunity. As it has been outlined, the business case for ESG 
disclosure made by the SSEI and the WFE involves both a defensive and a 
strategic position.290 The defensive rationale consists of staying ahead of 
regulatory innovations and avoiding the risks resulting from 
environmental disaster or activists’ campaigns.291 The strategic rationale is 
the possibility to get new business opportunities, to access new markets 
and to target socially responsible investors. For investors, full disclosure 
 
 
287 Boiral & Henri, supra note 104, at 291-96.  
288 Id. at 301. 
289 It is, in fact, clear that a simple statement about the non-materiality of the issue as justification 
for non-reporting without further specifications is prone to disguise cherry picking itself. 
290 Vogel, supra note 7, at 2 (distinguishing between strategic and defensive rationales about 
CSR practices). 
291 Nickolay Gantchev, Mariassunta Giannetti & Rachel Li, Does Money Talk? Market 
Discipline Through Selloffs and Boycotts (ECGI Working Paper n. 634/2019) (finding that after 
disclosure of negative news about environmental and social issues investors and consumers can 
impose market discipline on corporations through selloffs and boycotts); Philipp Krueger, Zacharias 
Sautner & Laura T. Starks, The Importance of Climate Risks for Institutional Investors, forthcoming in 














would be advantageous to implement a more accurate pricing process, but 
it could be damaging insofar as the disclosure of bad information, that 
otherwise would have no impact on share prices, could create financial 
damages. The position of investors as enforcers of regulation through 
disclosure is therefore per se conflicted, insofar as many unsustainable 
practices fuel profits and cause share prices to rise, whilst some of them 
create business risks that entail a threat to shareholder value. 
These contradictions create a tension between a full and accurate 
disclosure practice of all of the relevant information, good and bad, and a 
practice focused on corporate advertisement which undermines the 
purpose of comparability and usefulness of information. This issue is not a 
technical one, but instead lies at the root of the politics and purposes of 
implementing an ESG reporting framework. Nevertheless, this issue 
cannot be solved by the current framework: adopting a shared 
understanding that ESG reports represent only greenwashing would 
undermine the whole purpose of the initiative. Further, the issue cannot be 
solved by deciding that full disclosure should be attained because this 
could damage businesses whose involvement is necessary for the whole 
system to function. 
B. Which Concept of Sustainability 
When the Sustainable Stock Exchanges Initiative was launched in 
2009, the then-UN Secretary General depicted it as a way to solve come of 
the most pressing issues of our time.292 However, the concept of 
sustainability that emerges from the disclosure framework is narrower and 
focuses on business risks for corporations, with the exclusion of 
information that either do not represent material risks or the disclosure of 
which could create risks per se. This is all the more evident with the 
exclusion of human rights violations and tax transparency from the 2018 
standards. These considerations make clear that the macro-social concept 
of sustainability does not forcefully correspond to ESG issues that have a 
financial relevance for single firms. Consequently, even if disclosure could 
have the effect to improve performance of corporations on certain issues, it 
is unlikely that it will operate the massive re-allocation of capital that is 
needed, for example, to tackle climate change.  
More generally, the fundamental problem is that the business case for 
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sustainable practices is per se limited. Outside of the shadow of public 
regulation, the fundamental contradictions between capitalist 
accumulation, environmental externalities and downplaying labor and 
social standards to save on production costs limit the extent to which 
corporations, as well as investors and stock exchanges, can force a 
meaningful change, despite the fact that certain more sustainable practices 
can sometimes be beneficial for profits in the aggregate.293 Nevertheless, 
the described disclosure framework can solve these deep coordination 
problems only superficially. Paradoxically, the effectiveness of the 
framework largely depends on the force of the threat of public regulations. 
A more effective threat, in fact, creates business risks for investors and can 
foster more pervasive reporting or more efforts.294 In fact, it is clear that if 
new environmental regulations are passed, or more stringent labor laws are 
approved some corporations could suffer financial damage.  
The institutional architecture that produced the framework is unlikely 
to broaden the embedded concept of sustainability. From the point of view 
of the drafting of the framework, the relationship of power between the 
rule issuers and the targets of the rules substantially impede a more 
binding standard. It has been shown that when corporations failed to 
report, along specific metrics, it caused the WFE to change them.295 Single 
exchanges that mandate ESG factors disclosure do not have incentives to 
implement broader rules because of competitive pressures and the risk of 
losing prospect issuers. Finally, apart from explicitly socially responsible 
ones, investors are interested in ESG factors because they affect the 
profitability of specific securities or of the portfolio, and do not forcefully 
care about a more inclusive concept of sustainability. 
C. Contesting the Framework? 
The analytical lens adopted in this paper allowed us to depict the many 
governance effects of the use of indicators in this specific context. On the 
one side, I have identified an internal power effect, where the target of the 
indicators is meant to be regulated by the indicator itself through investor 
pressure. This effect is undoubtedly present in the SSEI/WFE 
 
 
293 More recurrent environmental disasters produce enormous economic harms. The reduction of 
labor rights and trade unions hampers growth and future profit prospects. 
294 As it has been argued, compliance with a private regulatory framework is enhanced by the 
risk of public regulation. Tim Büthe, Private Regulation in the Global Economy: A (P)Review, 12 
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framework.296 Nevertheless, even from an internal point of view, this 
effect is much more nuanced than it initially appears because of the 
institutional factors at play in the framework. First of all, the supposed 
users of the indicators (investors) have conflicting interests, and their 
interests could be damaged both by compliance and non-compliance. 
Second, the institutional structure requires the buying-in of exchanges and 
on several occasions of corporations themselves. Apart from the pure risk 
of non-compliance, the desire to enroll as many participants as possible 
and the participatory elaboration of the indicators have resulted in the 
selection of the indicators that are preferred by the regulated subjects.297 
At a higher theoretical level, this casts doubts on the role of simple targets 
of rules in international regulatory frameworks. 
From an external point of view, it has been demonstrated how 
investors’ demands and a narrow definition of sustainability have created 
the possibility of producing the indicator and the fundamental role 
exercised by the SSEI and the WFE in the enrollment of stock exchanges. 
This confirms the importance of transnational financial associations in 
expanding the influence of financial actors in drafting regulations.298 
Occupying the regulatory space, as well as the legitimacy claim that the 
sustainable corporation label entails, have a political relevance that 
transcends the actors involved and implicates the broader society.  
In light of the social importance of ESG factors, it could be sensible to 
require broader participation from civil society actors or more 
accountability from corporations through adequate global administrative 
law procedures.299 Nevertheless, I remain skeptical about the possibility of 
global administrative law to make corporations and investors more 
accountable in the context of this specific framework. First of all, this 
voluntary reporting scheme has been made possible exactly because CSR 
and SRI have been reframed and curbed to business relevant ESG 
factors.300 The historical analysis at the beginning of the paper casts doubts 
on the possibility to enlarge the factors ex-post. Secondly, the indicators 
have been drafted in order to make them business relevant and in a way 
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297 As it emerges both from the process of elaboration of the indicators and from the fact that 
factors that were not reported were excluded from the list. 
298 McKeen-Edwards & Porter, supra note 162. 
299 Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krish & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global 
Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005). This is the seminal paper about the 
emergence of global administrative law. 
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that implicitly assumes a specific ideology about the relationship between 
business practices and sustainability and about the adequateness of market 
mechanisms to foster more sustainable practices. If this underlying logic 
remains unaltered, it is possible to attain incremental improvements, but 
the potential of the indicators remains somewhat limited.  
Finally, this would not solve the issue of the users (and enforcers) of 
the broader information disclosed. For example, CSR reports have been 
assessed as meaningless and often NGOs do not even read them;301 it is 
therefore difficult to think that just more disclosure would be significant in 
shifting corporate and investors behavior. 
However, even if business-centered, civil society can exert some 
leverage on the ESG factors disclosure framework described. As it has 
been argued, two of the main risks that concern investors involve 
reputation and more stringent regulation. Corporations that show that they 
are ahead of new regulation should be less risky from this point of view. 
Therefore, political pressure for more regulation could exert also an 
indirect effect through the disclosure framework. The creation of a 
potential risk, even without the formal adoption of any new piece of 
legislation, albeit limited, is the best way that third parties have to harness 
this business centric ESG framework to amplify their demands.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
This paper has provided the first analysis of the SSEI-WFE framework 
for reporting ESG factors at the global level. A composited analytical 
framework has been developed to take into account the regulatory force of 
indicators, the political-economy dynamics of the actors involved in the 
project and the role of transnational financial associations in expanding the 
role of financial actors in crafting regulation. The paper has outlined the 
success of the institutional entrepreneurs in enrolling stock exchanges but 
has also cast some doubts on the possibility that the indicators as currently 
drafted can solve the technical problems underlying ESG issues 
disclosure. 
As this paper has demonstrated, the indicators have empowered stock 
exchanges to occupy the regulatory space and to align the diverging 
interests of corporations and investors, promoting and spreading a specific 
concept of sustainability linked to business risks and strategic 
 
 














opportunities. Despite the claim of the prominent role that investors and 
corporations could play in environmental and social matters, the indicators 
to assess these improvements are narrowly focused on financially relevant 
issues, to be determined for every corporation according to the concept of 
materiality.  
Because of the frameworks’ institutional characteristics and historical 
development, it is difficult to challenge the concept of sustainability 
embedded in the indicators from within the boundaries of the framework 
itself, as it is unlikely that even a broader framework can be effectively 
deployed to foster a different conception of sustainability. However, 
activists’ campaigns on specific issues can increase the business risk 
deriving from specific sectors or open up business opportunities. If these 
campaigns receive attention and gain political salience, even a merely 
business centered ESG factors disclosure framework could – at least 
minimally – amplify them. However, this reinforces the idea that a 
political battle is more promising for enforcing meaningful change rather 
than hoping that rational investors imbued with information reallocate 






























1. WFE 2015 Indicators 

















































Source: WFE 2015 Exchange Guidance and Recommendation, 11. 
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